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Summary
The prime purpose of this thesis is to devise a method for aggregating beliefs in deci­
sion situations involving conflict. In the process of conducting this investigation it has 
been found that a completely fresh approach to interpreting and modelling uncertainty is 
required.
The major mathematical tool employed throughout this work is Catastrophe 
Theory. The relevant aspects of this subject are presented in the first chapter and are 
repeatedly used in the three main sections of the thesis.
A considerable part of the work is concerned with the new way of eliciting state­
ments about beliefs. A number of illustrations is included in order to provide an intuitive 
feel for this interpretation of probability. The proposed method gives a basis for an aggre­
gation scheme. Catastrophe Theory provides the framework for constructing aggregation 
rules sensitive to aspects like conflict, grouping and precision of information. Some partic­
ular models are described in detail.
In another section the geometry of a certain type of mixtures is analysed. Mixtures 
can be used for modelling aggregation problems and their main properties are discussed.
0. P reface
Catastrophe Theory
The early seventies witnessed the emergence of a new mathematical theory. Intro­
duced by Thom (11) Catastrophe Theory quickly established itself as a branch of Singu­
larity Theory and became a recognised part of Pure Mathematics. However, Thom had 
created the subject with an intention to model various phenomena in natural sciences. He 
believed he was making a contribution to philosophy. Thom’s "disciples" hoped to extend 
his ideas to other fields such as the social sciences. The general enthusiasm inevitably car­
ried over into the realms of Statistics. The time seemed to be ripe for a wide range of 
applications. The early work was done, among others, by Zeeman (28,29) and Harrison
(29).
After the initial avalanche of models had died down a little, it suddenly became very 
fashionable, in the mid seventies and thereafter, to criticise and discredit all the work in 
which Catastrophe Theory was being used. Admittedly, the catastrophists had contri­
buted to their own downfall by an often indiscriminate use of Thom’s famous models. 
Sussmann (27) lists a number of cases where, in his view, Catastrophe Theory models had 
been applied inappropriately. Zeeman and Harrison do not escape his axe either, despite 
the fact that Zeeman has been acknowledged as Thom’s "first officer". Clearly Sussmann 
is questioning Zeeman’s credentials as a social scientist and not as a mathematician.
Nevertheless, in a brief spell all the early excitement vanished and the number of 
applications fell considerably. The subject had built up such a bad reputation that most 
social scientists took it as a point of honour to both criticise it and avoid any connections 
with it. Nowadays a layman may almost have an impression that Catastrophe Theory has 
been refuted as a mathematical theory.
No doubt the rise and fall of Catastrophe Theory is not unique in social science. 
Nevertheless it is slightly unusual that a sound mathematical method had been put to so 
much misuse and abuse. After all some, more theoretical, applications have been
successful. Smith (24,26) and Cobb (17-21) have managed to "slip through" a number of 
results without too much hostility. Obviously, once things settle down a hit, a more seri­
ous approach should allow Catastrophe Theory to make a significant contribution to 
mathematical modelling in Social Science.
Probability Theory
Statistics has inherited a burden of interpreting probability measures, one of the old­
est tasks of modern philosophy. Measure Theory provides an easy calculus, but fails to 
answer questions concerning interpretation, updating and aggregation of probability 
measures. This century a number of new approaches have emerged challenging the most 
basic concepts of sharpness and additivity. Kolmogorov’s axioms are under scrutiny in a 
way reminiscent of Euclidean axioms of geometry.
Philosophy
Twentieth century philosophy of science has inevitably affected trends in Statistics. 
Carnap (3) regards the quantitative theories as the ultimate objectives of all sciences. He 
believes that more and more fundamental concepts ran be quantified. This belief is in line 
with the general tendency to discretise most of the basic concepts such as time, length and 
mass. Terms like "chronon" and "hodon" are to represent the basic units. In a sense this 
is not saying anything new: the Greeks have postulated the existence of elementary parti­
cles and called then "atoms". Just because Dalton has called a much larger composite by 
the same name does not mean that the Greeks have been contradicted.
The "digital approach" with irreducible units has infected the approach to measura­
bility of beliefs. Astonishingly, it is also here that the resistance to discrete concepts has 
risen. Walley and Fine (39) and others have seriously questioneil the modern approach to 
probability theory and have replaced it with a system based on non-additivity and non­
sharpness of beliefs. In general, the insistence of precise pictures of reality has been criti­
cised by the development of Fuzzy Subsets (see. for instance, Kauffman (4) ).
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Thus there appears to be a new trend towards a continuous and smooth reformula­
tion of some scientific concepts. Contrary to the popular belief. Catastrophe Theory also 
propagates a continuous frame of reference. After all, although Thom's theory appears to 
be concerned with discontinuous change, it deals with sudden raptures by analysing a con­
tinuous underlying structure. Therefore, however discrete, every model is embedded into 
a continuous framework.
There appear to be two diverse trends in the modern philosophy of science. They 
clash in many areas and, in particular, in the structure of beliefs dispute.
Outline of the Dissertation
The prime interest of this work centres around the interpretation of the basic con­
cept of probability. The idea to redefine this concept has been instigated by the work on 
the aggregation problem. The main difficulty within the aggregation dispute seems to be 
the inherent structure of the Kolmogorov system in which there is a place for exactly one 
measure. Using this single measure it has proved very difficult to construct a structure 
where several measures could be credibly combined into an aggregate representation. 
Encouraged by the recent attempts at reformulation of probability concepts we embarked 
on erecting a brand new model.
The starting point is Catastrophe Theory. The necessary concepts are outlined in 
Chapter 1. We make a special effort to introduce the geometry of the Butterfly Catas­
trophe which is central to most of our later analysis. The Butterfly, and its properties, are 
less known than the famous Cusp Catastrophe model. Most of the authors bypass the 
four-dimensional control space of the Butterfly, but we examine it carefully. We believe 
that the Butterfly will be of a much greater use in modelling conflict in Social Sciences 
than the Cusp.
What has Catastrophe Theory to do with the model of probability? Once again the 
inspiration comes from the aggregation problem. While it appeared reasonably natural to 
use catastrophe models to model conflict associated with amalgamation of different beliefs
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we have also found that it may be advantageous to use a similar structure when defining a 
single measure. After all a unified theory is more appealing.
In Chapter 2 we describe our approach. The fundamental component is an "energy" 
function defined on a suitable space W . It is a smooth potential function and Catas­
trophe Theory is used to analyse its properties. Sample spaces and events are subsets of 
W determined by this energy function. A probability measure can be defined using the 
same method. We give an illustration of the method by considering Bernoulli Trials. The 
important aspect of this formulation is the inherent use of Catastrophe Theory. Alterna­
tive events are viewed as competing regimes and dynamics deride the likelihood of their 
occurrence. For convenience, we adhere to Kolmogorov’s axioms, but other methods can 
be formulated in our language: for instance in order to set up an "upper" and "lower" pro­
bability model it is sufficient to superimpose two or more energy functions over the same 
space W .
The aggregation problem is tackled in Chapter 4. We operate within the Decision 
Theoretic framework and we consider only simple systems where at most three conflicting 
derisions are in competition. We use the energy approach to construct the Derision Space. 
Energy functions now become the expected loss functions.
The energy approach is designed to give a more general structure than either Proba­
bility Theory or Decision Theory. In fact in Chapter 2 we use terms like "spaces of alter­
natives" to denote any spare with an associated measurable function. Energy functions 
create a dynamic structure and set up an "energy field" over each space. Attractors of 
those systems are termed "observables" and Catastrophe Theory is used to analyse their 
multimodal construction.
We take a small detour in Chapter 3, where we discuss the mixture model intro­
duced by Smith (24). The model is generalised to the rase when the scale parameter 
becomes an extra control factor. We also discuss benefits of using j-romponents mixtures 
vis a vis a j-modal Cobb (21) type density.
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The model for probability presented here should be treated as an illustration and an 
experiment. It is quite clear that fresh formulations are possible. What was once viewed 
as a "natural* representation of beliefs has been shown to be fallible. A parallel can be 
drawn with the Euclidean geometry: Apparently there is nothing natural about a space of 
curvature zero, and humans can perceive positive or negative curvatures just as easily.
Notation
Unless otherwise stated H denotes the real line, Z is the set of integers and t is used 
to label the time axis.
Statements of the form
X  6’ (a ,6 )
mean that G is a distribution function of the random variable X  and (a,6) is the parame­
ter space.
1. Catastrophe Theory
1.1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis we shall use simple models from Catastrophe Theory. It is 
therefore appropriate to introduce this subject. We shall content ourselves to a very shal­
low treatment concentrating on aspects directly relevant to the rest of the work. For a 
complete description the reader should consult Thom (11), Poston and Stewart (9) or Zee- 
man (13-16).
Catastrophe Theory is concerned with the study of the qualitative development of 
form. In particular, sudden changes in this development are of interest. Any given process 
can be modelled by a parametrised equation, referred to as the potential function. Even 
when this model is perfectly continuous and smooth in all its variables, the resulting pro­
cess may exhibit sudden changes in behaviour. Classification of all types of such 
phenomena, known as catastrophes, is the object of Catastrophe Theory.
Mathematically the problem reduces to the analysis of parametrised polynomial 
equations of various degrees. Catastrophes correspond to appearances and disappearances 
of critical points of these curves or surfaces. A complete classification of qualitative types 
is available for curves with parameter spaces of dimension not greater than 5.
1.2 B aaie Definitions and Results
Loosely speaking any smooth curve can be locally approximated by its Taylor series 
expansion. Catastrophe Theory concerns itself mainly with the qualitative properties of 
curves near their critical points.
Definition
Let f  :R - R be <7* . x0 is a singularity of order k , i.e. of type x* , if 
d 'f
-----(x0) * 0 for i = l,...,4 + l.
S i’
and
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a * '* /
if j
(*o) *  0
Denote a singularity of order * by /»t (N.B. refer to A , , simply as a "singularity"). 
We shall work with potential functions of the following kind:
V: X  x C -  R . V it C*
where
X  C R'
C C R '
are open subsets.
X m "Behaviour Space" - in our applications r is usually I.
C — "Control Space" or parameter space. In our applications t will never be 
higher than 4.
Write K,(r) or V'fi.c) for V : Jfx C -  R and z c X , e t  C .
For an example of a potential function and illustrations of the definitions below see 
section 1.3.1.
Definition
r -  corank of the potential function 
« »  codimension of the potential function
Definition
Let V (z,c) = 0 be a potential function. 
Define
|(*,e) « Jf *C : — (*.*) -  0 JM -  x * x  
as the Catastrophe Manifold of V , i.e. the set of critical points of V .
The geometry of M is our prime interest.
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Definition
Let x : M -  C be the canonical projection defined by
X(*.«) = «
known as the catastrophe map.
Definition
Let
I d V a*K
\ (x.c)* X xC: ---- (x,c ) = 0 , ---------0¿X fix*
be known as the singularity set of V .
Definition
Let , dV(JflM) = I x c X : there eziztt t t  C  t.t. (*.«) = 0
Hz
Deft nition
A point (x0,t0) t .V/ is called a bifurcation point if for any neighbourhood of e0 in 
C the projection
n ,_ :  N ' - ( A I M )
defined by
i
IHV )n e (e) -  x -  ----- (e )  (0)
• l ax /
is discontinuous at e0 .
Denote by Hv the set of bifurcation points of V .
Intuitively (x0,c0) t M is a bifurcation point if the corresponding potential function 
V'(xq,c0) changes topological type at c0 , i.e. gains or loses a stationary point. It will not 
come as a great surprise that
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Lemma 1.1
M is a smooth submanifold of X x C .
Lemma 1.2
S. = X(S)
Thus Bv is a set of inflection points of V .
Definition
A catastrophe is a singularity of x •
The main result from Catastrophe Theory we need is the following.
Theorem 1
Any singularity of x is locally equivalent to one of type Ak with k «  e .
It is important to note that the topological complexity of critical points is only 
dependent on the dimension o f the control space. From a practical point of view we can 
draw two conclusions:
(i) any potential function is equivalent to some polynomial of a finite degree;
(ii) complexity of the critical points is independent of the corank, and therefore, 
we should aim to reduce the dimension of the behaviour space to 1 whenever 
possible.
1.3 Two Catastrophes
At this stage it is common to go through the classification theorem and list all the 
existing catastrophes in each codimension. That is completely superfluous for our purpose 
and we shall only describe two types of singularities. At the same time the analysis 
presented will be reasonably thorough. We shall not attempt to present the full 
mathematical context, but simply treat the reader as a practical statistician interested in 
applying the method.
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1.3.1 Cusp Catastrophe
Consider the following potential function .
V(i;a,6) = —z* — —i z 2 — ax (cl)
4 2
where z t  X  , the behavioural variable, is of dimension 1, and (a,6) * C -  R 2 is the control 
space.
This family of parametrised curves contains basically two qualitatively different 
types as is illustrated below:
V
d r  > ( * r
X.
\/
( i r < ( i r
JUo. I ■ I
There exists a continuous boundary between the two types given by 
s i
(c2)
Let us examine the control space of V :
The potential Kfrja.fc) , is bimodal over the shaded region and unimodal outside it. 
On the boundary V’ has an inflection point either to the right or to the left of the single 
minima.
What about the origin of the control space? ( 0, 0 ) € C appears to have some special 
properties:
(i) it is the only non-smooth point on the boundary;
(ii) Any neighbourhood of ( 0, 0 ) is homeomorphic to the whole control 
space.
Property (ii) says that any neighbourhood of the origin contains all possible types of 
functions in the family. Note that the origin is the only point with that property.
Let us re-examine the situation using the notation and results of the previous sec­
- 12
tion.
Then
.Vf = | (z,a,6): z3 — bz — a = 0 J 
is the catastrophe manifold of V .
S = | (z,a,6) € .Vf: 3zJ -  6 = 0 |
is the singularity set.
Mall
Finally, we can see that
(XlAf) = «
x(S) -  j («,6): 5 = 3z*. a = -2 z 3 ) 
and the only singular point of x(E) is the origin ( 0, 0, 0 )
We refer to this singularity as the Cusp Catastrophe . It is easily seen to be of the 
type A t .
The following geometric illustration of the canonical cusp catastrophe is quoted by 
all authors:
I - 3
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The curved surface in R3 is the catastrophe manifold M . It is smooth at all points. 
The singularity set S is the red curve in R3 . Planes parallel to the x - axis touch M along 
points of £ only. The natural projection of X onto the control space gives the wish-bone 
shaped curve - the boundary of the bifurcation set Bv .
It is worth stressing the importance of this boundary. Write
3 3
ft = (c3)
ft is known as Cardano discriminant of the cubic equation. In our context ft >  0 
corresponds to two local minima of V' and ft <  0 to just one local minimum.
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(I) Case d <  0 , fixed
It is enough to examine the potential function to see that the problem is 
reduced to a cusp potential:
(a) terms x* and z* are both positive
(b) term x3 can be eliminated by a change of coordinates 
Thus,
(i) e = 0 gives a single cusp at 
x = 0 
a = 0 
6 = 0
(ii) e <  0 
From (1.3):
e = x(10x2 -  3d)
gives the x - coordinate of the cusp.
practically
>  z <  0
- 15 -
Say
e = c0 <  0 
z = z0 <  0
and the coordinates of the cusp become
The (a,6) - sections of the bifurcation set for e <  0 and e >  0
(iii) e >  0
Say e = <•„ >  0. Bifurcation set is the mirror image of case (ii) 
with the cusp point at
* =* *o >  0 
a = O « * o ’  - * ) > 0  
i = -  15*„4 + U z S  <  0 
e * c0 >  0
Clearly, the case d <  0 can only be of interest as a "passing state" of
the butterfly potential.
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(2) Case d >  0 , fixed and c = 0
We shall examine the shape of the (o,6) - section of the bifurcation set and look at 
the corresponding sections of the catastrophe manifold ( i.e. the surface V  = 0 ) as well 
as the potential functions’ shapes at these control points.
The catastrophe manifold is given by the equation (1.1):
V (r) = xS -  dz* -  bz -  a = 0 (1.5)
with < = 0 and d >  0 , a constant.
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) together with e 0 constraint give rise to the following 
shape of the (a.6) - sections of the bifurcation set:
i • i
- 17 -
dV
Corresponding (a ,i) - sections of the catastrophe manifold, = 0 :
dz
X.
o
- V i - o t c  c ©
«l>Cea.c^  | •
- 18 -
Corresponding potential functions for points in (o,6) - plane lying on the inters
tions of broken lines in diagram 1.6:
4>
I ’ Î
- 19 -
The diagram can be reflected in the 6 - axis to obtain a perfectly symmetric picture 
for a <  0 .
Consider again diagram 1.6. The black figures indicate the number of local minima 
exhibited by the potential function. The red and green lines dividing those regions 
correspond to inflection points of the potential function.
The equations of the "butterfly" shape are:
V  (*) = *s -  dz3 -  bz -  a = 0 (1.6)
V '( i )  = 5*4 -  3dz* - 6 = 0  (1.7)
Eliminating 6 from (1.6) we obtain
a = — 4x& + 2dx3 (1*8)
6 = 5x4 -  3d*1 (19)
The three cusp points are given by
rtb
—  0
rix
20*1 -  6d* = 0
But, from (1.9) :
Therefore,
*  =  0 or tx
U
10
, 3 d t \  9d1 + 206_
10
No real solutions for 206 <  - 9 d*
Kour real solutions for < 6 < 0
Three real solutions for 6 0
Two real solutions for 6 >  0
(all clear from the diagram 1.6)
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Thus, 6 - coordinates of the cusps are
9 d2
b = -  ----- , 6 = 0
20
From (1.8) we get
ria  4 2—  = 0 = — 20x + 6 dz
dx
2 2 3d There f  ore z = 0 or z 10
So, the a - coordinates of the cusps are
a — 0 or a
Hence cusps occur at points
8*x3 
25* x 10
O y coordinates ( 0, 0, 0 )
( 3d 8^3 41 9d2 )
D, coordinates I , d , — I
y 10 25\ 10 20 t
i 3d 6V3 9 d*
C, coordinates I — , — _d , —
V 10 25\ 10 20
We now proceed to find the coordinates of the quadrant OAXB , the region of most 
interest as its interior defines a family of potentials with three local minima
Starting with X  :
— rfx* — bz = 0 with a — 0
Thus z = 0 or
, d i  \ d* + 46
z =
2
But at X  (1.5) has a double root, i.e.
d1 + 46 = 0 and x* 
Hence the coordinates of X  are
£
2
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Let (a,6) - coordinates of B be (a0,i0) . Then A has coordinates ( — o.0.60) . Before we 
find the values of a0 and b0 let us examine the geometry of the potential function and 
the catastrophe manifold at those points.
The (a,i) - section of the catastrophe manifold at b -  b0 looks as follows:
X
The (6,x) - section of the same manifold at a a0 has the following shape:
X
- 22 -
Let us analyse the curves in diagrams 1.9 and 1.10.
The equation of the curve in the diagram 1.9 is given by (1.6) with 6 A0 . Writing 
it as a function
o (i)  = i 5 — dz3 — b0z
we see that a[z)  has four turning points at z 2, - z a, - z ,  s.t.
“(*a) = “(~*i) = ” ~a(“*i)
This implies that
( 1 1 0 )
(111)
oa . ,
---- = 5x — 3 dz — ba
dz
has four distinct real roots of the form
( 112 )
- . - * 1
- ♦ {
3d + X 9dr  +  206o 
10
3d -  \ 9d*~+ 20ba
10
(1.13)
( l . H )
and —i, - r ,  .
Note that the condition k0 s  0 for all roots to be real is satisfied at b0 .
20
Similarly, consider the curve in diagram 1.10 as a function
fc(x) = z* -  dz1 -  z * 0 (115)
X
This curve has three turning points s.t.
*(**) = M~*i)
—  = z* -  dz* -  bz -  a„ -  0 (1.16)
dz
the original quintic form of the equation (1.15) has five real roots in z , namely z l% z2 
(repeated root), — i ,  (repeated root).
Thus (1.16) can be factorised as
(* -* ,)(x - .r ,) , (i ■*-*!)’  “  0
and
- 23 -
x, +• 2z 2 — 2 x t — coe f f ic ien t  o f  the z* term = 0
giving
(1.17)
3d -  \  9d2 *  206o 3d + V 'sd *  + 20 60
10 10
Putting (1.13) and (1.14) into (1.17) we obtain
Hence
9 d .— . -------------
—  = V 9 d *  +  2060 5
179 ,
h0 = --------- d 2
500
Putting this back into (1.13) and (1.14) we get
V 25
v  25
Finally, from (1.16) we can quickly find that
831 ^  3 , , 
a0 = d
12500
Thus, we now have the coordinates of all corner points of the quadrangle containing 
the 3 - minima region of the bifurcation set:
I • l l
(1.19)
(1.19)
(120)
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We are now in a position to find the conditions for the existence of the third 
minimum of V[z)  .
Denote by u>(r,) the branch of the bifurcation set corresponding to the root r, of the 
"generalised" equation (1.12) , i.e.
- 25 -
d >  0
<  6 <  0
a2 <  —  11 OS if3 - (36d2 +  206)^ 9d2 + 204 + 180<26 I X
io3
(*)
(**)
( . . . )
d‘  -
id
102
6 2\ 9d
18<T * 6 d^ 9d + 206 + 206 + — d £
d2
with + if — ^ 6 ^ 60
4
-  if 60 s  6 s  0
We can now summarise these conditions by defining
q(a ,6 ,e O.d ) _> 0
if and only if (*), (**), (***) all hold, otherwise q <  0 .
Thus n is positive on the three minima region, and negative everywhere else.
(3) Case d >  0, fixed and c >  0, fixed
We aim to generalise conditions q for the case e £ 0 . Since the manifold is per­
fectly symmetric around e 0 it is enough to look at the case e >  0 .
First let us look at the geometry of the (o,6) - section of the bifurcation set for t >  0 
and d >  0 .
Recall, the discriminant given by (1.4):
d tT = ---- —
5 2
It will replace (*) in the system of inequalities q:
- 26 -
t >  0 is a necessary condition for V(z) to have three local minima whenever c * 0 .
For the case t > 0 , consider the following (o,x) - section of the catastrophe mani­
fold.
I • I i
- 27 -
Notice that if e <  0 all the pictures have to be reflected in the a -  0 axis.
In order to complete the generalisation of q it is necessary to solve the following 
equations:
C > )
(Ü)
(Hi)
d 'V  . -
------  = 5i* -  3dz -  2cz -  b = 0 1.2)
dz*
subject to t >  0. This equation will have 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2 real roots 
accordingly as b increases ( refer to diagram 1.12 for t >  0 ). The 
branches of the bifurcation set (a,6) - section will be given by those 
roots, say
x, = cu1(6,c,<i) i = 1,2,3,4. 
Putting (1.1) and (1.2) together we obtain
a -  x*( — 4x* + 2dz *  e) (1.21)
Again referring to diagram 1.12 we have to determine the coordinates of
the cusp points in order to define regions of b over which particular real
roots <u, exist, i.e. we must find end points of the branches of the bifur­
cation set. It is clear from the diagram that
ui, tzitls for 6 — o0 (1.22)
u»j tzittt for l 0 S I i  I ,
ui3 tzxst» for 6j S I S
u>4 czistt for I , i  t
Thus exact computation of all the condition can cause some problems as 
it involves solving a quartic (1.2). However it is not necessary for us to 
have the exact solution. Clearly the method is analogous to the case 
e = 0. Only all the equations and inequalities become functions of e .
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Therefore we can state 
Theorem 2
For fixed d >  0 and fixed c >  0, with t > 0
V(x)  = —i* — —dz* — —ex3 — bz2 — az (b)
6 4 3 2
exhibits three local minima over the following region of the sub-control space (a,6) :
Zj[ — 4Xj3 + 2dzJ + e) <  a <  x,( -4x ,3 + 2dz + e ) 
d2 V
where x|t z are roots o f ------ = 0 , and take the following particular values:
dz2
= u»3 and x, = u>4 if 6, 5 4 -s 63 
z} = u»3 and x, = w2 if i 3 s  6 s  b2
[Note: diagram 1.12 is drawn for the case when the "pocket" does not cross ui, . 
This, however, occurs when t is large enough. The above condition has to be 
suitably adjusted. This complicates explicit calculations even further, but the 
intuitive idea is as simple as the case described here.)
Summary - Effects of control parameters.
The above analysis is not very helpful for getting an intuitive feel for the properties 
of the Butterfly Catastrophe. Neither is it particularly easy to appreciate the sensitivity of 
the shape of the potential function to changes in control variables.
This section will concentrate on these general aspects, and an effort will be made to 
minimise tedious calculations.
The control variables of V(z)  can be crudely divided into two pairs:
(i) a and t  control the symmetry of the system: a affects the position of the
unique minimum and the relative heights of two/three minima when 
these occur; t affects the position of the cusp and the shape of the bifur­
cation set.
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(ii) 6 and d are the "bifurcation factors": they control the number of sta­
tionary points of V ; 6 causes bimodality while d creates a "split within 
a split" and causes trimodality.
It must be remembered that groups (i) and (ii) interact at all times in the sense that "crit­
ical values" of 6 and d depend on particular values of a and e respectively, etc.
This brings us to the two discriminants which effectively link symmetry factors to 
bifurcation factors.
fi = (c3)
is the Cardano discriminant of the cubic and it determines completely the qualitative 
behaviour of Cusp Catastrophe. Mere, however, it is no longer independent, and a new 
discriminant emerges
(1-4)
,•> * a c
5 2
t can be thought of as the "discriminant within a  discriminant", since it is constructed as 
d3 V
the discriminant of 0 , which is a cubic.
dx3
The pair ( fi, t ) are a good .practical way of summarising the qualitative behaviour 
of V . It is a much simpler approach than using the q equations. It must be remembered 
that t is the independent discriminant, whilst fi is sensitive to values of t. t gives an 
immediate answer to the question "Can V be trimodal?", but fi, designed to answer "Is V 
bimodal?" gives only a qualified reply.
We are nevertheless able to give a string of weak results and conclusions to describe 
properties of t and fi and their relationship.
Notation
Write the control spare C (a.b.t ,d ) as a Cartesian product
C = A x D
where A = (o,4) and D = (e,</) are two-dimenzionai 
subspaces of C .
Definition
Let A C A . Define
A = J (a,6) € A t.t. fifa,6) >  0 J 
Similarly, for D t D define
- 3 0 -
D = |  (e ,d ) f D e.t. t(c ,d ) >  0 J
Lemma I
Let A be a bounded subset of A . Then there exists a D e D s.t. V(z)  is bimodal on 
A x D .
Proof
Consider the following (a ,6) - section of the bifurcation set, together with the wish­
bone shaped ft 0 curve:
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WLOG take A to be the set bounded by p,, —p, and line 6 6 .
It is now enough to prove that A is contained in the bimodal region of an (o,o) - sec 
tion of the bifurcation set for some D e l )  whenever b is finite.
Choose D € D with the following properties:
(i) c = 0
(ii) d >  0
We will show that for any fixed b , we can choose d(b ) > 0 s.t.
D = | (e,d) : e = 0 , d >  d (b ' )
will be as required.
Refer to the diagram: it is enough to show that for any fixed b it is always possible 
to choose d s.t.
b z  b'
(In fact equality holds when d d(b )) .
Recall that the size of the pocket is an increasing function of d . So is the intercept 
of a», and the a - axis. This can be seen by combining equations (1.13) (with 6 0 ) and
(1.8) to get the value of the intercept as
2_
5
Similar calculation will yield intersection of m, and any b - coordinate. In each case this 
intercept will be an increasing function of d. Therefore d{b ) can be chosen as required. 
Note that only in the most general case we will require DCD .
Lemma 2
V{z) trimodal on 3 x D C A x D implies D Q D , but not conversely.
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Proof
Refer to diagram 1.11. If V{x) is trimodal then this diagram is the relevant section 
of D and obviously OCD .
But conversely we can easily choose a region A s.t. V is not trimodal on A x V for 
any OCD .
Lemma 3
V(z) trimodal on A x O CA x D does not imply A CA .
Proof
Refer again to diagram 1.11. Region AOBX meets A only at the origin.
Corollary
If e = 0, d >  0 , then
I V: A  e A ' | | V: V trimodal = *
Lemma 4
If Kir) is trimodal on A x O C A x D and AC A , then t * 0 
Proof
Follows from corollary above as the intersection is now non-empty.
The above results are intuitively more obvious than analytically. They can be useful 
for quick tests on trimodality, as well as tests on "availability of trimodality", i.e. they 
can provide an indication that there is a possibility of a third mode occurring should some 
of the parameters evolve in a particular manner.
The main reason for introducing (fi, t) in place of q equations is that the former can 
be more easily handled in statistical inference and estimation.
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1.4 Remarks
(1) The Cusp and Butterfly Catastrophes are essentially sufficient for our purposes. 
Nevertheless more complicated models exist and may have to be used. In particular 
straightforward generalisations of the cusp and the butterfly will occasionally be 
referred to in later chapters. L'nfoldings of an Ak , singularity can be written in the 
form
for an even integer k ^ 2. The control space C = (ot ..........a,) has codimension k .
Vk , ,  exhibits at most k — 1 local minima.
The family of potentials | Vk , t : k 2 2, even integer\ is called the "cuspoid family"
generalised to multidimensional behaviour spaces if necessary.
(2) The Vk , potential is usually referred to as the "canonical model". A function 
F : U -  R is said to be equivalent to Vh. ,  if it is of the same topological type. 
Stewart (10) defines such "topological equivalence" of two smooth functions
as follows.
Suppose WLOG / ( « )  0 = p(v) . Then /  and g are equivalent near u and v if there
exist neighbourhoods £/, o f u and K, of v , in U and V respectively, and a 
diffeomorphism
k~2
X
2a^i *■ i ,r
2
(g)
of catastrophes and is defined over a 1-dimensional behaviour space. It can be further
f - . U Q R ' - R  
g: V C R ' -  R
6: Ut -  Vx
s.t. the diagram
-  fR.
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commutes.
(3) Potentials like Vk,,  will be used as expected loss functions, densities and, more gen­
erally, energy functions. Their basic characteristic, multimodality, will prove crucial 
in our approach to statistical modelling.
2. General Framework
2.1 Introduction
When viewed as a branch of Measure Theory Probability Theory is a closed book. 
However, both the quantitative development as well as the interpretation of probability 
range far beyond the realms of abstract mathematics. We wish to examine the latter 
aspect: the motivation and the link with the real world that probability measures claim to 
possess.
Constructing probability spaces consists of two parts:
1. Identifying a sample space, say 11, with a suitable algebra of events, say 
A.
2. Defining and interpreting a probability measure on ( 11, A ).
Part 1 has generally attracted little attention. In Part 2 the "interpretation" aspect 
has been extremely controversial. Opinions have been so diverse that some even claim 
that classes of probability measures have to be defined on every 11, and an existence of a 
single probability measure is just a restricted, special case ( see, for instance, Walley and 
Fine (39) ). Clearly the problem is a philosophical one and not mathematical.
It appears that there exist numerous difficulties associated with Part 1 as well. 
Indeed, this and other issues which we are planning to discuss are all interwoven. Decision 
Theory has always lain on the border of Probability Theory. Its internal structure is 
mathematically equivalent to that of Probability Theory. We intend to consider a more 
general framework in which decision spaces and sample spaces are going to be examples of 
"spaces of alternatives" which we define later.
The aim is to construct some kind of a new general structure and then attack prob­
lems like "updating" and "aggregation".
w
\
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2.2 Some Philosophy
Barnett (30) identifies four basic approaches to probability interpretation:
(i) classical - A uniform measure is set on to a chosen partition of il . This
leads to a circular definition of probability based on a concept of sym­
metrical "equally likely" events. Although this fact alone is not usually 
regarded as a major objection, the approach fails to explain how indivi­
duals are supposed to recognise those mysterious types of events. Princi­
ples of "cogent reason" and "insufficient reason" only provide an intui­
tive pirture. Borel claims that everyone has his own "primitive notion" 
of the concept. All these rather vague arguments have meant that the 
classical approach has been largely abandoned.
(ii) frcqucntisl - This assumes that the relative frequency of occurrence of 
an event converges. This is an empirical approach and it aims to create 
an "objective" model of the world. The early protagonists of this method 
were Laplace and Venn, but the mathematical basis was properly set up 
by Von Mises (37). Fundamental concepts of this approach are "repeat- 
able experiments", mutual exclusion, independence and conditional pro­
bability. The main criticism o f the frequentist view concerns the crucial 
notion of "repeatable experiments". It requires countably many copies of 
the sample space at any time in order to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of any event. In many situations we may wish to assign pro­
babilities to outcomes which are clearly "one - off". Frequentists would 
like to be able to do this in all circumstances, but the "repeatable experi­
ments" framework does not always provide a valid interpretation.
(iii) logical - Probability is a measure of implication. In this approach the 
concept of probability becomes a part of logic. The treatment is mainly 
axiomatic, and numerical values are not thought of as essential com­
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ponents. The logical method was developed by Keynes, Jeffreys and Car­
nap (32). The "Principle of Insufficient Reason" and frequentist methods 
are often used in a practical context. Critics object to the inflexibility of 
the abstract mathematical structure of the logical approach.
(iv) subjective- Probabilities are measured by individuals’ disposition 
towards bets. The governing law is "coherence". What is coherence? 
Basically it is the aim of an individual to conform to Kolmogorov’s 
axioms and thus to avoid the ignominy of a "sure loss" from his bets. 
This approach rejects the necessity of a universal probability structure 
and relies on each individual to construct his own probability model of 
the world. The entire philosophy is a stark contrast to the frequentist 
view. Opponents criticise the lack of objectivism and the inherent depen­
dence on personalist viewpoints.
There are two other modern approaches not mentioned by Barnett.
(v) entropy approach - Probabilities are calculated by maximising entropy,
i.e. minimising information, subject to the given constraints. It is a phy­
sical approach and is described by Williams (56).
(vi) fuzzy approach - Intervals are used to represent uncertainty. Instead of
a single valued probability of an event a pair, "upper" and "lower" pro­
babilities, are assigned to each event. Usually a subjectivist view is used 
as a basis for this construction. Thus, in terms of gambles, the lower 
probability of an event A is the largest price an individual is willing to 
pay for the gamble on A when he stands to receive 1 unit if A occurs. 
The upper probability of an event A is the lowest price an individual is 
prepared to accept in return for a bet on A .In  general, it is claimed 
that this leads to a non-additive probability model. Effectively this 
approach questions the existence of a unique measure on any sample
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space. It is a strikingly unorthodox view, and it is in direct conflict with 
the frequentist ideal. See, for instance, Walley and Fine (39).
Apart from the basic notion of probability several other issues have led to disagree­
ment. The most famous problem is the one of change in beliefs. Measure Theory lends lit­
tle help in this matter, and each school of statistics prescribes its own method. The 
mathematical structures are reasonably similar, but once again interpretation varies. All 
schools agree that a change in belief corresponds to a change in information. New beliefs 
are conditional on the information received. Subjectivists employ Bayes Theorem. Sam- 
plists do not object to the mathematics of that theorem, but they disagree about the way 
in which Bayesians apply it. On the whole they do not accept the suitability of some sub­
jective information. The entropists repeatedly use the minimisation of information princi­
ple, and new information is entered in the form of constraints on the probabilities in the 
model. Williams (56) claims that Bayes Theorem and Jeffreys rule are special cases of that 
principle.
It is possible to summarise the philosophy behind each approach with the following 
diagram:
V M C ( - M A - t
I M F o l t n l t T i O M
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and an equation:
Changt in Belief function o f  (Change in information)
Several comments spring to mind:
(i) Vlost approaches do not recognise any changes in the structure of sample spaces. 
After all if 11 is chosen to be large enough any information can only restrict the sup­
port set of the measure. In no situation ran this sample space be actually enlarged, 
c.f. Williams (56): events of prior probability zero cannot have positive posterior pro­
bability.
(ii) The "Information Space" remains a mystery. What exactly is information and how 
can it be measured? Is it a vector or scalar quantity? Can we ever lose information or 
do we always gain some’  Each approach in its own right tries to answer these ques­
tions indirectly. After all, concepts like significance levels, support sets, likelihoods, 
the principle of minimum information and Fisher’s information all in some way 
attempt to evaluate the state or the increase in information. Yet none of the above 
agree to the meaning of "information". Indeed each method interprets this concept 
in a totally different way.
(iii) Our equation, A belief / (  A information ) , suggests the existence of some 
dynamic structure here. Especially if we can define information in such a way that it 
is measurable. However, thus far, generally the increments of information have been 
presented as discrete and often "large". None of the methods above are sensitive to 
small changes in information. Consequently calculus procedures are not likely to be 
helpful.
(iv) The relation between information and time, and thus, indirectly, between probabil­
ity and time has never really been examined. Naturally, we assume that any new 
information comes to us in the future, but still many problems remain, e.g.
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(a) Is the rate of flow of information relevant?
(b) Can beliefs be altered in periods of time when no information is received?
Time Series models are updated at points of time. These are generally discrete and 
are introduced as reference points for collecting information. In quantum mechanics 
more effort is made to relate probabilities to calculus.
In short, we believe that sample spaces and their associated measures can be success­
fully viewed as functions of time. Thus the triple
| *». a , p  J
should be written as
j  «(<),  ¿ ( t ) .  P M ) |
This extra parametrisation creates no new problems. Whenever undesirable we can postu­
late, in particular cases, the constant case
| 11(0, ¿ ( 0 ,  n o }  = { n, A , P }, for all t.
We intend to show that, in many situations modelling can be simplified and clarified by 
reference to the t-axis.
Note, incidentally, that Decision Theory suffers from exactly the same problems. 
Sample spaces are replaced by decision spaces and probability density functions are 
replaced by various utility, risk and expected loss functions all of which have the same 
mathematical structure. Incidentally, no method has ever been proposed to update utili­
ties.
In general our approach is to introduce a dynamic structure on any space using 
measurable maps defined on it.
It is our intention to propose a completely new way for modelling uncertainty. In a 
traditional set up events and their probabilities form the primitive structure. We look one
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stage further back and begin our modelling by first constructing an underlying structure 
for events and probabilities.
The basic element of our representation is an energy function. All the energy func­
tions we will look at are potential functions of the type described in Chapter 1. The con­
cepts of events and probabilities will be generated by the energy function. In this way 
events are viewed as secondary concepts appearing on the surface of the model. The entire 
structure is evolved from the underlying dynamic provided by the energy function.
We begin with an example.
Introductory Example
N players compete in a golf tournament over 4 rounds. After 2 rounds there is to be 
a cut reducing the field by a half. An observer is given the list of all competitors and is 
asked to construct a model representing his beliefs about the prospects of each partici­
pant. The model is supposed to assign the probability of winning the competition to each 
player. Our observer is requested to produce two distributions: one prior to the com­
mencement of play on the first day and one after the cut has been made at the end of the 
second round. Scores of all players will be available to him.
How should the model be constructed and how might it be constructed in practice ?
Ideally, a Bayesian observer would devise a prior distribution based on his knowledge 
about each competitor. He would then update all probabilities by some suitable function 
of scores in the first two rounds. If a particular player is eliminated at the cut his poste­
rior probability is reduced to 0 and all remaining probabilities are normalised. A non- 
Bayesian would confine his assessment to those players who made the cut and would 
assign the probabilities according to the scores. He would, no doubt, refuse to commit 
himself before the first tee-shot.
In practice it seems doubtful that any observer would go through the pains of the 
above procedures. Consider the following simplified scheme.
Before the start of the competition our observer ( we shall call him O ) chooses a 
subset of size n s  N  , say >4,, , of players he considers as main contenders. He then
assigns probabilities j px, . . . , pn J to each one of them with p, < 1  , and sets
• • I
P (A k ' ) 1 — “  Po • This gives his prior distribution.
After the second round he picks a new set of size k , say B k , of all those players he 
still believes to be in contention. He then proceeds to assign new probabilities
J i , ..........q k | to each member of B k using scores and his prior estimates as information.
k
Again he ensures <  I and P(Bk ) = 1 -  «  9o .
• - 1
Thus the prior distribution is concentrated on ( n * I ) points while the posterior is 
concentrateil on ( k +  1 ) points. However, if n <  N  , O cannot ensure that B k is a subset 
of A, or even that k is smaller than n . Therefore O is faced with a possibility that his 
posterior will be concentrated not only on points from A, , but also on several points of 
A „C . Since O has treated A j  as a "single point" he could be forced to add new points to 
his initial sample space.
When modelling beliefs of some individual we must use a theoretical structure flexi­
ble enough to cope with many complex situations. It would be nice to be able to adopt a 
Bayesian model in all circumstances, but in practice we may find its scope restrictive. An 
individual may be capable of expressing statements about uncertainty without adhering to 
any particular models or obeying any sets of axioms. If we tried to "stretch" his views to 
fit into some rigid framework we could easily distort his picture of reality.
For instance, in the above example, O may, quite possibly, turn out to be far less 
worried about coherence than we have previously assumed . He may, say, ignore all 
players outside A. and effectively assign probability 0 to A . ' ( i.e. take p0 m 0 ). 
Nevertheless, when constructing Bk he may need to include some players from A. , and 
he will have to assign positive probabilities to those players. In other words, events with
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prior probability zero could end up with positive posterior probability. Bayesians and 
Entropists would definitely object to that!
The above example could be made more complicated if we removed the information 
about the original entry into the tournament. Suppose our observer O does not know 
either the size of the entry ( N ) or names of all competitors. His information may be par­
tial: he knows a set of i\0 players definitely competing; he may speculate about some 
other entrants; but there is a subset of players he has never heard of. Under such condi­
tions he cannot specify his sample space, but that need not stop him from expressing his 
opinion about chances of various players. He may well proceed using the earlier described 
analysis. After the half way cut his sample space will crystallise, but he may be forced to 
consider events which he never even listed in his prior model.
In our view modelling human beliefs using sample spaces and coherent probability 
measures as fundamental concepts can run into difficulties. The above observer, O , could 
often fail to conform to a whole set of axioms and still remain a successful predictor or 
gambler. And even should he turn out to be a disaster we may still wish to be able to 
model his beliefs.
An important question to consider is what precisely is it that an individual examines 
when faced with a problem like the one described above? Does he treat the victory of 
each competitor as an event and tries to estimate the plausibility of its occurrence? Or 
does he try to assess the potential of each competitor to become a future winner?
In our opinion a typical observer considers the latter problem. Thus his tendency 
would be to weigh the relative evidence pointing towards various players, and he would be 
less interested in quoting standard probabilities. We shall attempt to construct a new 
method for representing beliefs, which is more adaptive to a less rigid type of analysis. In 
our model we shall use a different primitive concept to describe uncertainty.
The energy function is the fundamental concept we shall employ. It will determine 
the structure of every model involving uncertainty. In particular it will generate the event
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space. Thus no longer will it be a prerequisite to specify the sample space of a model. 
Events, which we will term "alternatives", will become secondary concepts as indeed will 
probability measures.
The definitions and basic properties of our method are described in the next section. 
Let us introduce this approach in loose terms by applying it to the above problem.
In order to help the reader to construct an intuitive picture of our philosophy we 
present just one more illustration.
Consider a smooth elastic surface in R1 curved to create a number of "hills" and 
"valleys". A silver ball rolled accross this surface will move along various geodesics until 
it looses all its kinetic energy, gets caught inside the rim of one of the valleys, and is 
brought to rest by the gravity at the bottom.
We interpret the above physical picture in the following way. The curved surface is 
the energy function, denoted by E, which generates the observer’s "uncertainty field". 
Gravity adds the natural gradient dynamic given by
di_ <IE^
dt dx
where z provides the local Euclidean measure and t refers to the time axis.
The valleys correspond to events or possible outcomes. The silver ball is interpreted 
as a dynamic random variable whose realisation is the particular "event-valley" in which 
it finally comes to a halt. The elasticity of the surface is viewed as dependence of the 
energy function E on "elasticity parameters" 0: Thus when we alter the shape of the sur­
face by changing the parametrisation we affect the underlying structure of the model by 
moving, removing and adding "valleys" and "hills".
In our philosophy concepts like a sample space or an event are nothing sacred. The 
reader should realise that the surface described above comprises much more than an ordi­
nary algebra of events. Only a subset of points on our surface can be identified with stan­
dard events. These points correspond to the "hearts of the valleys" where the silver ball
Idbisbis
may come to rest. Other points can never be observed in the usual sense. But our formula­
tion is dynamic, and therefore parameter induced earthquakes can destroy some valleys as 
well as create new ones. In such a context a traditional concept of a probability measure 
becomes almost irrelevant. Instead we consider the "attraction region" of each valley 
inside which a silver ball is trapped. A standard probability measure can be deduced from 
a more precise definition of an "attraction region" and will be discussed later.
We first summarise these ideas.
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Consider a potential function defined on a real line as follows:
E: R x V -  R
is a potential function on R parametrised by some V C R . We shall refer to E as an 
energy function and we shall use it to describe beliefs of an individual about any problem 
involving uncertainty. The event space and the probability measure are determined by E . 
"Possible outcomes" are defined to be points z t R corresponding to the minima of E . 
The associated probability measure is induced from the dynamic on R generated by E :
dz
dt
dE
dz
z t R
Thus events are the stable equilibria of the dynamic. The probability of an event is pro­
portional to the size of its basin of attraction. The shape of E is controlled by the parame­
ter space V .
X .  X ,  X  ,  - X s
P# -wV tA < 4 •--- It  ^ X k | l|  |
2. |
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In our example, the Bayesian observer is using an N - modal energy function to 
specify his beliefs. His posterior distribution is more concentrated: information has 
reduced the number of modes. O is unable to classify such vast amounts of information 
and his beliefs can be modelled by an energy function with only ( n + 1 ) local minima. 
This energy function determines the prior event set 11, containing ( n + 1 ) points. The 
information provided by the first two rounds alters the shape of E , and, in particular, 
affects the location of the local minima. This gives rise to a new event set , 112 , with 
( * +• 1 ) points in it.
The energy function contains a complete picture of O 's beliefs. It can list the set of 
possible outcomes he considers at any point in time and evaluate the associated probabili­
ties. It can cope with incoherence and changes in the event structure.
2.3 Basie Definitions
Throughout the rest of the chapter we will never go beyond the scope of the 
Euclidean spaces. The following concepts will be used repeatedly:
W = "World " Space. The largest domain we shall use. It can be thought of as 
a continuum which contains any sample or decision space mentioned. It 
is a smooth manifold, and, in one - dimensional cases, it will inevitably 
be represented by a subset of the real line. In general, the most compli-
n
cated version of W will be of the form W |_J ft,, where Rn C R ', for
ncl
n t  Z' , a t  I , some index set, is a differentiable manifold.
See section 2.4.2 for an example of a World Spare.
d  ■“  Parameter ( Control ) Space, ft’  , n as large as necessary.
T  ■ "Time" Space, ft* , with t usually equal to 1, provides extra parameteri-
sation.
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Each of the above spaces will be equipped with a local Borel measure, which will be 
denoted in various ways as convenient.
Usual Euclidean topology ran be defined locally for any subspace Rit of W. Thus
(c) will denote a ball of radius e around e t R it and, more generally, a neighbourhood 
will denote any connected subset of Rn containing c .
E 3 Space of Energy functions of the form:
E : H’x B j X f  • R (2.1)
Each E t E will be C ‘ at all points fl of <->E , subspace of 0  , and all w € W , ( t T . Thus 
£ is a potential function in the sense defined in Chapter 1.
Define codimension of E to be the dimension of 0 E . 
d 'E
—— (x,0) will denote the value of the rth derivative of E w.r.t. the local measure on 
rlx'
W evaluated at the point (x,0) * W x 0  .
We are going to describe situations involving uncertainty using models of the follow­
ing structure.
Definition
A model is defined as a triple ( W, E , T ) where E t E . The dimension of the model 
is the codimension of E .
Thus, for instance, we will replace a standard probability model
( 11 , A , P )
by
( w  , E , T )
E will determine 11 as a subset of W and will generate a probability measure on the 
algebra of events, A . T will give extra parametrisation to handle development of 11 and 
the change in the structure of P .
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The dimension of the model introduces an equivalence relation on E , but it is a 
weak concept in our context.
Definition
Define Ae , the Space of Alternatives of the model (W , E , T )  , to be the set
u u
H *
SE
z  € W: —
f)Z
( 2.2)
Thus Ae is the set of all fixed points of E  w.r.t. the measure on W  under any 
parametrisation (0,f) of E  . Trivially, A EC W  for all E  t  E .
Definition
X € W is a stable a lte rna tive  if
HE
(x,0,<) = 0 for a ll 0 * H, for a ll t t  T  
Hz
Definition
I € A fc- is observable if it is a stable equilibrium of the dynamic induced on W by E  
in some parametrisation (0,<) * H E x T  .
In the same vein we ran introduce two complementary concepts: 
Definition
z t A e  is unobservable if it is an unstable equilibrium of the dynamic.
Definition
x c A e is transient if it is not a fixed point of the dynamic in any parametrisation.
See section 2.4.2 for an intuitive illustration of these concepts.
Thus every E  * E determines a space of alternatives. However, this mapping is not 
injective and many E  can lead to the same A . It is worth our while to classify various 
spaces of alternatives without any reference to energy functions.
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Definition
Na is a proper neighbourhood of a t A in W if Na is a subset of A .
Definition
A is discrete if no a t A has a proper neighbourhood in W .
Definition
A is locally continuous if there exists some a e A which has a proper neighbourhood 
in W .
Definition
A is a piece-wise continuous if A is locally continuous at every a t A .
Definition
A is continuous if it is a proper neighbourhood of every a t  A.
Example: Gaussian Energy Function
Consider a model ( R, n(0,l), T) where the energy function
n: SxH x T - 0,l|x T
has the Gaussian form
ntK -ei) =
t t t T.t
v. 2 u
The space of alternatives turns out to be
z t  R : x  = 0 R, for all t t  T.
M.M- R
Thus T provides an extra dimension to the parameter space.
Analogous models can be defined for any unimodal density on H . Note that x e R 
is observable if it is a mode in some parametrisation.
Discrete densities are not differentiable, therefore their energy functions do not 
correspond to pdf’s. However, they can always be defined by assigning values to unobserv­
able points and demanding:
(¡)
dE
(x ;0 ,f )  = 0 for z « A E
dp.
(it)
£(x,0,<) />,(* = x; 0)
An example and an alternative formulation is provided in the next section.
An analogous argument holds for decision spaces. Now energy functions take the 
shape of expected losses, utilities, etc. Spaces of alternatives correspond to decision spaces.
2.4 An Illustration: Energy Models for Bernoulli Trials
2.4.1 Introduction
In an attempt to construct models for discrete distributions we shall begin by consid­
ering a simple "coin-tossing" experiment. It will then be quite straightforward to extend 
the method to Bernoulli trials.
The motivation behind our approach has a direct physical basis in this case. There­
fore, it is perhaps appropriate to treat discrete distributions as a starting point for our 
"energy interpretation" of probability.
- 50 -
2.4.2 A Model for a "Fair Coin"
Let us examine the physical shape of the coin. Like any object under gravity it will 
come to rest in a position minimising its potential energy.
Clearly, the energy E depends only on the height of the centre of gravity, x, above 
the horizontal.
Assume, for convenience, mg = 1 , where m = mass of the coin. Then the potential 
energy of the coin is given by
E  =* x
= A cos0 , e < n
2
We can extend the definition of the angle 8 to the whole real line by adding tt for 
each half turn of the coin. This produces a more general form of the energy function
E I A cos0| , 8 c H
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which looks as follows:
£
2 ■ 5
Define
dE 2a+1 )
---- -------- u 1 = 0 ,  n t Z
dO 2 I
Then the natural dynamic on » induced by E and given by-
gives
0 =
dE
dO
in -1
0 = -------- It , n € Z
2
as the minima of potential, and
0 = nit , n t  Z
(2.3)
as the maxima of potential.
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The dynamic (2.3) can be described qualitatively by the phase portrait:
- tt i t
2 H
We may call the equilibria states in the usual way:
2n — 1
8 - — n Head
8 - nir
Tails
Next we postulate that the space of alternatives of the coin consists of two observ­
able states, "Heads" and "Tails", and one unobservable state, "Edge". Using the standard 
metric on the real line we can induce a probability measure on the space of alternatives 
determined by E .
Definition
Define the probability of occurrence of an equilibrium state to be proportional to the 
size of the basin of attraction of this state under the given dynamic.
Consequently, by enforcing Kolmogorov’s axioms, we arrive at
i 2n —1 )
P 8 = -  -------- Tl = P
2n + l
P(8 = nn) ”  0
«
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Note that it is sufficient to use the interval as the World Space W of
the coin. In this case 6 = ——, — are the observable states, ft = 0 is unobservable and
2 2
other states are transient.
2.4.3 Generalisation to Bernoulli Trials
Consider a Bernoulli Trial with probability p of success. It would be natural to 
extend the idea of the energy function corresponding to such an experiment from the 
energy function of the coin. However, we no longer have the analogy of a physical object.
Suppose we adopt the opposite approach and start with the phase portrait. By a 
direct analogy it must look as follows:
< --------------O
P
—>----
I -  p
Ac«. 2 • S’
It has two attractors, with respective basins of attraction of size p and 1 -  p and one 
repellor dividing the two basins.
Let the World Space of the model be X. Let the equilibrium states ( the alternatives) 
be given by
z = u(p)  , minimum
z — v(p)  t maximum
z = ut(p) , minimum
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Graphically, we could express them in the following way:
w. tp l = PJL*i
v  <_p) ■=
3
w  ( p )  -
Note that v(p) acts as a separatrix between observable (stable) states given by u(p) 
and if (p ) .
The graph can be smoothed and approximated by a cubic with the same properties.
X
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Since this is a graph o f the stationary values of an energy function, the actual energy 
function will be equivalent to a quartic with two minima u(p) and w(p) separated by a 
maximum v(p ) .
t
ctct, ^  2 ■ S
An example of such a potential function, with attractors at 0 and 1 , is presented in 
the next section.
2.4.4 Link with Canonical Cusp Catastrophe
As can be seen from earlier diagrams Bernoulli Trials have models behaving very 
much like a cusp catastrophe. In fact for a fixed positive value of the splitting factor, Ber­
noulli Trials can be described by a path joining the boundaries of the bifurcation set in 
the control space.
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This can be seen on the familiar diagram.
Thus p can be viewed as the normal factor with boundary conditions P c 0,1 ensur­
ing at least two stationary values of E .
Let us leave the Bernoulli Trials for a moment and have a look at a number of appli­
cations of bimodal energy functions to decision problems.
First suppose we are modelling a decision problem using a cusp catastrophe potential 
with a fixed splitting factor 6 60 >  0 :
■ « 1 2F (i) = —z -  ~ k 0z -  a.1  
4 2
Suppose the competing decisions lie in the neighbourhoods of i  - x, and z -  x0 . 
We are interested in the likelihood of a switch between the decisions as a enters the bifur­
cation set.
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For each a c Bifureation set define u(a), u»(o) to be the values of z corresponding to 
the minima of V near r0 and *, respectively, and »(a) be the value of z corresponding to 
the maximum of V .
X
ft.
¿ 1 0
Then define
pa =  probability of a switch from z t to z0 at a
tt(a)-»(a) 
u (a)— w(a)
Thus pa increases with a as it traverses the bifurcation set left to right. We use the 
position of the separatrix to define a measure on the bifurcation set. In this way we gen­
eralise other switching rules used in similar situations:
1) Maxwell Rule, defined by
Pa “
where m satisfies V,(u(m()
{1 if a >  m 0 if a <  m 
= F(ui(m)) .
2) Delay Rule, defined by
P,
1 if a 2  d 
0 if a <  d
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where d lies on the right boundary of the bifurcation set.
Suppose we wish to model a decision situation when the two conflicting alternatives 
are stable and fixed at x 0 and x 1 . One interesting model can be constructed as fol­
lows.
Let E be an energy function satisfying the differential equation 
dE
z(z  -  p)(x -  1), p c «  
dz
Then
x 1 4 1 3 1 j£|i) = z — (p + l)x + pz + constant 
4 3 2
(*)
It turns out that this potential has a number of interesting properties. The energy func­
tion can be mapped on to a canonical cusp catastrophe by substituting
1 + P
y =  *  -
to give
with
1 4 1 iE {y )  -  —y — by — ay + constant
1
a = --- (p +■ l)(2p -  l)(p — 2) Normal factor
27
1 ,6 = —(1 — p + p ) Splitting factor
3
The energy function (*) has three stationary values at x 0, p, 1 . The fact that E 
pivots on x 0 ( since £(0) 0 for all p ) gives the equation an unbalanced look. We can
restore the symmetry by adding a constant term (» ~ ’¿P) 
24
The final form of the potential is
£(*)
1 4 1 ,
- x 4 -  - (p  + 1 )x* 
4 3
I  ~  2 P 
24
(**)
Let us examine some properties of E viewed as a function of p .
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Lemma 1.1
£(0) + E( 1) = 0, for all p
Thus the alternatives obey a certain kind of "conservation of energy" law.
Lemma 1.2
£ ( 0 )  >  E ( l )  < = >  p <  hi
The global minimum of E has the larger basin of attraction. Using the Maxwell Rule 
the switch occurs at p = W .
Lemma 1.3
For p t [ 0, 1 , x 0 and x I are the only alternatives.
At a first glance this result implies that we need only consider the family 
| Ep(z) : 0 s  p s  1 J to model our decision problem.
Lemma 1.4
When p 0 , x  0 becomes an inflection point and x I remains the only observ­
able. When p 1 the roles are reversed.
The Delay Rule commands us to switch only when the current preference is no 
longer available. Other rules are also possible. We discuss some of them in 2.5.
Let us examine the behaviour of E when p lies outside the 0, 1 interval.
Lemma 1.5
When p <  0 , x = 0 becomes a maximum. A new minimum emerges at x = p . 
Similarly, when p >  1 , x = 1 becomes a maximum.
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Lemma I.A
E is symmetrical for three values of p : p — 1 , p = Vi and p = 2 . The respective 
axes of symmetry go through z 0 , z 1 p and x = I .
Proof
E is symmetric <  >  a 0 <  >  p — 1, to, 2 . Axes of symmetry follow by
Lemma 1.5.
So the roles of the stationary points can be interchanged. The Maxwell switching 
points correspond to the axes of symmetry.
In a practical context the decision maker would need to relate the value of p to his 
information. His actions would be determined by his choice of the switching rule and the 
relationship
p = /(<)
where, in general, /  : T -  R' ( r an integer ) is a bijective map which we will refer to as 
the information function . In the case with two alternatives the range of /  is one­
dimensional.
Definition
Information function is said to be bounded if its range is homeomorphic to 0, 1, .
Theorem 1
Let E be given by (**), p / ( i ) , /  information funrtion.
Then E determines a set of stable alternatives , AE | 0, 1 j <  -  >  / i s  bounded. 
Proof
Follows directly from Lemma 1.3.
4
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Mathematically the result is not a great revelation, but its implications for modeling deci­
sion problems are quite exciting. The main negative inference from the theorem is that 
unbounded information inevitably leads to unstable alternatives. Intuitively this means 
that a decision maker who cannot ensure deterministic information is in no position to list 
his options.
Potential functions can be used in situations when sample or action spaces are 
difficult to specify in advance. This method should also be applicable in predictive models 
to deal with outliers.
The behaviour pattern of the stationary points of E in the bimodal case is pictured 
below:
t o  COut 
t  o C-CA-C
oU 0- i  l l
- 6 Ibis -
The above diagram illustrates a common phenomenon which has thus far been 
largely ignored. An innocuous binary decision problem is determined by the behaviour of a 
single control p . Whenever the value of p lies inside the 0,1] region the problem is trivial. 
Our model offers a facility to deal with the situation when the information fails to con­
form and falls outside the 0,1 interval. A new option z p emerges whenever p f 0,1 . 
Lemma 1.6 predicts when this new alternative becomes optimal under the Maxwell Rule. 
The most important aspect of our model is that the Decision Maker is able to alter his 
action space according to the information received and is not constrained by an erroneous 
"a priori" choice.
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To complete the mapping of E on to the canonical cusp catastrophe we have to 
increase the dimension of the parameter space.
To do this consider the first derivative of the extended energy function given by
= *[(x -  /) -  1(* -  1), / * 0.1]
k
where F,: X  x C -  R with C = ( p, k ) . k t  (0,^) is the scale parameter and I e 0.1 is 
the location parameter. For each l t  0,1 , F, is homeomorhic to the canonical cusp catas­
trophe.
Intuitively k affects the switching rule between the alternatives x 0 and x = 1 and 
/ induces a bias towards either option.
The control surface C is presented below. Its main characteristic is the straight 
boundary of the bimodal region.
The bifurcation set is enclosed by the lines p = /(I — k) and p =* /(I — k) * with
(p = l' lc »  iim t ) as the cusp point. Traversing across the bifurcation set on a path 
€-0
parallel to th p - axis a decision maker using a Delay Rule switches sooner for small 
values of k . As * approaches 0 the switch is almost instantaneous.
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The presence of the location parameter l implies that, strictly speaking, our model is 
a section of the butterfly catastrophe with l as the bias factor and no access to the third 
mode.
The "dual" energy function — F, can be applied in testing. For instance, consider a 
quality control model given by
G\ = - / " , =  -*[(*  -  /) -  —  ](* -  1)
where the two maxima at z 0 and z 1 correspond to accepting and rejecting a tested 
batch. The unique minimum at z = p can be interpreted as a Likelihood Ratio statistic in 
a sequential test with
l =  prior belief about batch quality; 
k =  risk factor.
Whenever the test ratio hits the boundary of 0,1] the decision to accept/reject is taken.
Cc~>e. °  u -  1 P j)  O
i t x  u ,  v C « v ,  X  s  O
----- C ^ . 2 13
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The potential function E in (**) can evolve in yet another direction. Suppose we 
replace E by
f f  (r) = z{z  -  p f { z  -  1)
Then H retains the topological characteristics of E . But if we perturb the middle term of 
the above equation to end up with
B'(z) z z -  (p -  *))(* -  p) z -  (p + c)](x -  l) 
where 0 s  t s  p s i  ,
then the energy function B exhibits three local minima whenever t >  0 . A full version of 
B unfolds like the butterfly catastrophe.
The above model can be applied to decision situations with imprecise information. 
For instance, using our earlier interpretation of p as an information function, in certain 
situations
P =  / ( * )
could turn out to have a stochastic structure and only a region p — c, p + « ' could be 
specified as a range of /  . Under such conditions a decision maker choosing between 
options z 0 and z 1 may defer his decision if * is large enough, effectively "sitting on 
the fence" at z p .
The same energy function B provides an interpretation for a betting scheme with 
"upper" and "lower" probabilities. A gambler is indifferent between bets on z 0 and 
* = 1 when the odds fall in the region p -  €, p + € 1 . Thus « measures the indeterminacy 
of the gambler’s beliefs.
In the next section we state the natural extension of Theorem l to the multimodal
case.
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2.4.5 General Discrete Sample Space
Phase portraits can be used to construct models for a general discrete distribution. 
We restrict ourselves to a countable number of observables, [f, in fact, this number is 
finite, say n, then we represent the phase portrait, generated by the energy function, by a 
( n -  1 ) - simplex.
Take the case n -  3 , for instance. One possible phase portrait looks as follows:
pies still remain the same.
It is always possible to construct an energy function for a given (n — 1) - simplex. 
This is proved in general in the next section. Let us first look at the restricted case when 
the space of alternatives is a constant function of time. We can devise an energy function 
by extending the potential (**).
Consider the differential equation
R
F a
o
0 S a i i t U s
A-tt —*>
oU e, ^  2. • I M
Analogously, the probability of an event is proportional to the area of its basin of
attraction. Thus only attractors are observable.
In higher dimensions the phase portraits become more difficult to draw. The princi-
dz
where n is an integer. Then 0, 1....  n - l is the set of stable alternatives.
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Define
by
I : T Rn i
f ( 0  =  ( P i  P | ( 0 ........  P„ I = p .  i ( 0  )
Then the statement of Theorem 1 can be extended to
Theorem 2
V generates a set of stable alternatives, A v -  | 0, 1,..., n -1  j <  >  / is bounded.
Thus the information determines the complexity of the space of alternatives.
2.4.6 Formal Conclusions
It has proved more natural to use the basin of attraction in defining measures on 
discrete spaces rather than the values of energy function at observable points. Since the 
basic components o f the model (W ,E ,T )  do not include a measure we are free to define it 
as we like. It is important to remember that it is the energy functions that determine 
measures and not vice versa.
Let us go back for a moment to a standard probability model for a discrete sample 
space and try to induce its associated energy function. Let it be a sample space with a
finite number of atoms uj, ........... Suppose there exists a probability measure P on 11
satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms. Assume that the support set of P contains exactly m 
atoms of 11 .
Then we can construct an energy function for this model using the following result: 
Theorem
Let be a (m-1 (-simplex with vertices in 11 defined by:
( *|. ’ ' ' <*m ) « I0-1!"m
-  «
• i
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Put in, (0,...,1,...,0) t 11 . Then there exists a functionE: Am -  ft
with the following properties:
(•') E is C ‘ on the interior of Am and right continuous and infinitely right 
differentiable on the boundary of Am
(it) There exists an injection 6: 11 - S , where 
S =  set of stationary values of E, i.e. the natural dynamic:
dE
dx
has all elements of 11 as its fixed points.
(iii) Each vertex of Am is in the support set of P . Thus in * 11 is observable 
<  >  P(in) >  0 .
(iv) For each in « 11 ,
p (u>) a A (in)
where A (m) volume of the basin of attraction of u> .
Proof
It is sufficient to construct one potential function possessing the required properties.
Consider
defined by
F:Am - H
V(zt , . . . , x m) -  1 -  J S « .1.* 1
Then V is minimised only on the vertices in, of Am . Therefore V induces the 
required type o f dynamic on Am . The sizes of the basins of attraction can be 
adjusted by the choice of constants e, .
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2.4.7 Comments
(i) Energy models can easily be constructed for discrete spaces of alterna­
tives. In some simple cases there is a nice physical interpretation not 
only for observables and unobservables, but also the World Space con­
tinuum containing them (c.f. angle 6 a coin makes with the vertical).
(ii) "Dynamics" and "basins of attraction" are concepts previously never 
associated with probabilities. Perhaps they can be of value.
(iii) Catastrophe Theory is once again employed to define an underlying con­
tinuous structure beneath the surface of a discrete situation.
2.5 Another Illustration: Perception and Uncertainty
Subjectivists often use gambles to elicit statements about probability. The energy 
approach provides another method of elicitation.
Consider an individual asked to choose between two outcomes X  0 and X  1 
modelled by a Bernoulli Trial
{0 w.p. p1 w.p. I — p
The value p is to be viewed as a summary of the individual's beliefs. It is an information 
function and its value is supposed to help the individual to commit himself to one of the 
two alternatives. The structure of this information function is analogous to the one 
described on page 60. The ivdividual must assess the value of p in order to decide which 
outcome is more likely.
In our formulation let X  denote the real line and X  -  0 , X  1 are the two alterna­
tives.
Let E be a family of potential functions generating all Bernoulli Trials. Thus any 
E t  E is of the form
Ei X  x ¡0,1) -  ft
with the following properties:
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(i) For each 0 <  p <  1
E , : X  -  R
has exactly 3 stationary values on [0,1] C X  : local minima at X 1 0 and 
X  = 1 , local maximum at X  = p ;
(ii) E0\ X - R has exactly one local minimum at X  -  1 ;
(iii) £ ,: X  - R has exactly one local minimum at X  = 0 .
The interval 0,1 forms the World Space of any Bernoulli Trial with ,i 0 and 
-V 1 as the observable outcomes and X  = p as the unobservable event.
Definition
Let E € E . A point a c 0.1 is called a Maxwell point if
(i) £.(0) = £„(1)
(ii) £,(0) >  £ ,( l ) i f  * <  a
and Et (0) <  Et (1) if t  >  a
Suppose we model individual's beliefs by a potential function E c E . We ask two 
basic questions:
(a) For what values of p does the individual back the event X  -  1 ?
(b) Given an initial value of p , say p0 , how does the individual react to 
changes in p ?
The answer to (b) is of a greater interest. At this stage we are not going to look at 
the issues involved in the updating of p . We shall assume that p is tractable ( at least to 
the individual himself ) and we can model individual’s perception of p by a dynamic of the 
form
j, g (t)  (2.4)
Bach separate dynamic may lead to different behaviour patterns. At any time ( the energy
function of the individual is
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: X  - R
where p(<) is a solution of (2.4).
The only other thing we need to know is the decision mechanism resulting in a 
choice between X  0 and X  1 .
Definition
An action function associated with a dynamic p{t)  is defined by
10 if X = 0 m chosen at time t 1 if is chosen at time t
Definition
A switching point is a discontinuity of A .
Any individual’s behaviour can be completely described by a triple
( E, pit), A f t ;  p ( t ) ) )
Let us look at several possible behaviour patterns. We assume that a given individual has 
reacted in a certain fashion to a situation involving uncertainty, and we have been able to 
model his response using the following energy function:
1 . I , 1 ,
F (z )  = —z -  ~ (p * \ )z  + ~ p z
4 3 2
with 0 s  p s  1 .
Note that Ep has a Maxwell point at p - 'n .
(a) Let
constant
0 if t >  *1 ¡r t S  W
and let the dynamic be of the form
M t )
P = t 0 s  t s  1
Maxwell point coincides with the switching point here. This model 
represents what may be termed the "rational action". The individual 
minimises energy by switching to the more plausible outcome at the
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(b)
earliest opportunity.
More general action function is of the form
0 if t >  p0( U r
A " =  i 1 i f , * P o
The dynamic is as in (a). This time the individual switches at an arbitrary 
time. So certain bias is introduced on his information. The same effect can 
be achieved with the action function in (a) and by either 
(i) choosing E with a Maxwell point at p0 ;
(ii) changing the dynamic to p(() = 2p0t .
In other words either the energy function has a bias, as in case (i). or the rate of flow of 
information is different to the outsider.
(c) Delayed action.
Consider a dynamic given by
( t for 0 s  t s  1 
l 2 — f for I < f s2
and the action function defined by
1 if t <  Vi+€
d (0 0 if W+c S < <  —+ €
2
3
1 if f 2  - + «
2
The switch occurs well past the Maxwell point as p progresses in either 
direction.
£  1 1 5
O * * i  I
I « * « X
_____
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Our individual is slow to acknowledge fresh information. He continues to
back his current choice for a longer period than his information suggests.
The extreme case (c is to stick with one local minimum for as long as
it exists.
Energy functions can be used to model various types of human responses when faced
with uncertainty. It is possible to represent almost any form of behaviour. The question
able in a given situation.
It is worth stressing that the energy approach does not presuppose any particular 
probability structure. For instance, case (a) above naturally leads to a simple additive 
method. But in case (c) it seems more appropriate to formulate an upper and lower proba-
YValley and Fine (39) of a difference between the "buying price" and "selling price" is well 
exemplified ( see also section 2.2 paragraph (vi) ) .
Elicitation remains a poorly examined part of Probability Theory. This analysis is 
an attempt to direct attention to the possibility of a dynamic foundation of the basic con­
cept of probability. A successful interpretation is quite likely to come from that direction.
2.6 Updating Problems
Thus far the "time" axis T has not played any significant role in our analysis. Now 
we shall take T R and write energy equations in terms of t t  T .
Consider a model [W ,E ,T )  written as
remains whether it would be possible to determine what particular energy function is sua­
bility model to explain the delayed adaption pattern. Here the basic notion upheld by
E[ i(<), 0(f) ) = o
and
Derivative w.r.t. the measure on W gives the "horizontal" structure on W x0 x  T .
Writing x and 6 as functions of t we can obtain the general form of the "vertical" struc­
ture by considering
ci E  H E
----  ¿(t) + ----  d(0 = 0 (2.5)
fix i)0
Suppose, in general, this equation can be solved by
«(<) = u(z,0,<) (2.6)
i  = v(x,0,t) (2-7)
Let us examine several desirable properties we would like these solutions to have.
(i) It seems dangerous to assume x(<) 0 , i.e. A {t )  independent of t , yet
whenever A is a sample space or a decision space this very assumption is 
inevitably made. In decision theory in particular such an attitude can be 
a gross oversimplification. Surely the options open to a decision maker 
often change and it is not always possible to define a decision space large 
enough to contain all the choices. Conversely, some options may vanish 
and it is not always clear that the utility structure can be "smoothly" 
altered to accommodate this fact.
(ii) Orthogonally to the plane
x = v(x,0,t)
or under assumption x(t) 0 , the change in 0 ,
0(<) = u(x,0,<)
is considered as the main aspect of modelling. We are going to refer to it 
as "updating". The form of u(x,0,t) is not clear in general. Intuitively, it 
seems desirable that
6(i) a Af inform ation ) (2.8)
and therefore, it is vital to define the concept "information" precisely.
(iii) Our meaning of "information" we use is slightly different to the one 
currently found in the literature. Fisher’s information is a measure of 
sharpness of a distribution. Williams’ entropy approach identifies new
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information with extra constraints on his existing distribution. We think 
of information as an impulse altering the energy structure of a model. In 
particular this corresponds to a vector in a t) -space. Thus "motion" is 
our equivalent of information. Clearly, inherently the updating function 
must be a function of information.
simply translates the information into a definite movement in the 
parameter space. Concepts like "discounting" can be defined within this 
formulation.
u> t R is the parameter of interest, 0 = (0,,0j) is the hyper-parameter space. /  is a 
conjugate prior for a random variable Y with a distribution
Example: One-Parameter Exponential Family
Consider a distribution taken from the exponential family.
Then given the outcome Y y the updating function for 0 € R2 is given by
u„|0,.»j) (», + v.0t + Mv))
An analogous updating procedure can be employed using our formulation. The 
interpretation of all the maps used is different from the usual one, even though the energy 
function E happens to be algebraically equivalent to / .  The updating equation given 
above can be viewed as a description of the way in which the shape of the energy function 
alters our time. Of course, in distinction to the probabilistic equation, we are not con­
strained only to use this updating rule since our structure is looser than the traditional 
one. In this example it must be remembered that the energy function which has the 
mathematical form of the exponential density is in fact defined on the R x H space and
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must not be confused with a density. We put
/?,(ui,0,t) = / ( oj;0), for all t with 0 = (01,0a)
Thus At = R for all t and <L(i) 0 . The vertical structure is given by
( ¿H<) )
(* ,(»). * . ( « ) ) -  | I. “ ~  |
with initial conditions
»(*<,) = (0.o-»2o). M'„) 0
Hence
«,(<) = ‘ + e,o
0,(<) -  6(t) + 02O
where i t  T is a realisation of another system with a distribution
R2(t |ui) - /(i;oi) u exp | ojt + 6(t )cx(oj) J
Here the structure of £, is sensitive to realisations of E2. Note that the space of 
alternatives of £ , becomes a parameter space of E2 whenever Bayesian type updating is 
considered.
Any "law of motion" along the W x 0  space is a function of information. But not all 
information has to be of the form in the above example. It need not be created by an 
interaction between two energy systems. For instance, vague prior information falls into 
the latter category.
2.7 Aggregation
2.7.1 Introduction
In recent years a lot of attention has been given to the so called "aggregation prob­
lem". In both probability theory and decision theory issues of amalgamation of beliefs or 
group decision making have at last been tackled.
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In probability theory the basic question can be phrased as follows:
(P) Let P and Q be two separate measures on some sample space 11 yielding values 
P(A) and Q(A) for some A e A , algebra of events on 11 . Does there exist an 
"aggregate measure" R =  function of P and Q on 11 , and if so, what is the pre­
cise functional relationship and in particular the value R(A)?
An analogous question in decision theory could sound like this:
(D) If individuals P t and D2 choose d, and d2 as their respective optimal decisions 
for the same problem \Hx,Lt ) , i= l,2 , on a decision space D, where (B,L) 
represent their belief and loss structure, then what decision
d = function o f  d, and d2 
will they make together?
2.7.2 An Overview of Recent Approaches
French (45) has recently published a paper outlining most modern methods in aggre­
gation. He has omitted to mention the last one in the following list:
(1) Bayesian Approach - an "investigator" treats expert opinions as data. Usually 
log odds are assumed to have Normal distributions. For details see French (42,43,45), 
Lindley (47), Morris (49,50), Winkler (53,54).
(2) Linear Opinion Pool Method - the traditional weighted averaging of experts pro­
babilities or log odds. Propagated by McConway (48).
(3) Stochastic Approach - Each expert updates his beliefs by other expert opinions. 
Matrix of all their beliefs converges under certain assumptions. See De Groot (41).
U ) "Non-Additive" Approach - Based on interval type elicitation aggregation meas­
ures retain many of the basic properties of fuzzy probabilities. They additionally obey 
certain desirable criteria. Developed by Walley (55).
In addition to listing and describing the main approaches French (45) has finally 
attempted to specify the actual problem faced in aggregation. He came out with these
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basic types:
(a) Expert Problem - an external aggregator does the assessing;
(b) Group Decision Problem - the full set of experts is responsible for the final out­
come;
(c) Textbook Problem - a group is asked to produce a joint probability assessment 
for an unspecified purpose.
From a mathematical point of view (a), (b) and (c) appear structurally equivalent. 
The differences must then be philosophical. Unfortunately none of the authors seem to be 
aware of French’s classification. Their main weakness seems to be the failure to specify 
the actual problem. Since, in the end, each one of them is working on a different set of 
assumptions, it is hardly surprising when they come up with different solutions. For exam­
ple, consider the disagreement about the Marginalisation Property: Lindley (47) and 
McConway (48) working under different assumptions come up with opposite conclusions.
Once again it is felt that certain amount of rigour and specification of fundamental 
concepts would not come amiss in the aggregation dispute.
We wish to present a more general approach. As usual we shall try to erect a 
dynamic structure flexible enough to include any of the older approaches as a special case. 
In many ways the methods listed above have been too specific. They may well have pro­
duced adequate results for specific situation, but have never provided a general answer to 
the aggregation question.
2.7.3 The Energy Approach
Let us begin by specifying the elements of the problem in our language.
Let £((c,6<,<) = 0 be the energy equations of n separate models
( H ',£ „ H j g e )  i = l .... .
Note that
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(i) Et specifies a space of alternatives A , , for each i.
(ii) 0, t ft, are control spaces of each Et , not necessarily of the same codi­
mension in Rk.
(iii) Each £, is additionally parametrised by the same space T.
The jj?, | are said to be aggregatable if there exists a continuous l-1 map
a :  0 j  x  • • • x (-)n -  (-)
and some energy function E € E
E: W x H  x T  R (2.9)
n
s.t. Ae , the space of alternatives determined by E, contains (J.4, as a subset.
i m 1
That is the most general scheme for aggregating within the framework of spaces of 
alternatives. Several points are worth noting:
(i) any previously used method is a special case of above;
(ii) the problem reduces to determining the map a and in particular the 
dimension of ft ;
(iii) although we provide a general guideline we are no nearer finding the 
map a , if indeed such a map exists uniquely.
In Chapter 4 we are going to be more specific and attempt, in some degree, to solve 
the problem in the decision theoretic framework (D).
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have tried to describe problems involving measurable spaces from 
a slightly different perspective. The energy approach is not designed to provide quick 
mathematical techniques for various branches of statistics - although one particular 
energy function described above has proved to be very useful in certain practical applica­
tions. In general our aim is to reformulate all the fundamental statistical concepts. This
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does not imply that our approach has to be used in all circumstances. The purpose of 
presenting it here is two-fold:
1. To introduce a common denominator and framework for interpreting 
probability and decision problems;
2. To provide a starting point for an investigation of updating and aggre­
gation.
The last few sections were concerned with a brief outline of this approach. At 
present it is not claimed that purpose 2 has been achieved. However, we believe that some 
initial ground work has been done. There are many directions for improvement: the 
dynamic set up presented above is deterministic; extra paramctrisation can provide basis 
for stochastic extensions.
It is vital that problems of complexity in the aggregation dispute are properly formu­
lated and embedded within some comprehensible framework. All past attempts seem to be 
disconnected and suspended in the air. The main object of this discussion is to put prob­
lems of updating and aggregation on a firm ground.
3. Asymmetric Mixture and Catastrophes
3.1 Introduction
In his Ph.D. theses J. Smith (24) has proved that a mixture of two identically shaped 
but differently located expected loss functions has the topology of the back-to-back cusp 
catastrophe whenever the expected loss functions are of a certain type. This class includes 
the Normal expected loss constructed from Normal beliefs and a conjugate normal loss. 
We shall refer to Smith’s model as the "symmetric mixture" to underline the basic charac­
teristic of his set up.
It seems only natural to attempt to generalise this result to the case when the 
expected losses are not identical. We shall only look at a very mild extension: both com­
ponents will still be of the same type, but they will have different scale parameters. Such a 
problem seems to be of a greater practical interest as we are more likely to encounter deci­
sion situations with each participant having either a different variance or a different toler­
ance for losses. As we shall show even this very gentle perturbation of Smith’s assump­
tions leads to many complications. The problem evolves dramatically. In some special 
cases the equations of the cusp point are at least one degree higher than in the original 
problem. We shall present the geometric view of the situation, and solve the Smith prob­
lem using this method.
In the main section of this chapter we shall prove that the existence and uniqueness 
of the cusp singularity depends on exactly one condition. To arrive at that result we will 
first examine the properties of the derivatives of the expected loss function. Later we will 
show that the Normal expected loss always satisfies the condition in question, and there­
fore the cusp singularity occurs. In another example, using a polynomial function, we will 
show that the condition, although satisfied, can lead to other solutions than those intui­
tively expected. It has been impossible to prove that this condition is an inherent property 
of T-type functions.
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The fact that a unique cusp point exists does not necessarily help in finding its exact 
location. In the general case there is not enough data to find the cusp point, while in the 
Normal case the equations to solve are extremely complicated. No doubt they can be 
solved using numerical methods. Luckily, in the polynomial example, the coordinates of 
the cusp point can be found explicitly.
Finally, we look at the relation between mixtures and the cuspoid family of catas­
trophes. In particular, we point out the natural embedding of a 2-component mixture 
within the Butterfly catastrophe.
3.2 Type T functions and their properties
3.2.1 Definitions
The type T function £(6,p) , where p is the scale parameter, is defined as follows:
For all p >  0 , E(0,p) is C* , generic, symmetric about 6 = 0 ,  strictly increasing 
with |8| , lim£(6,p) - 1 , and
(i) E"  has a unique zero in (0,*) at pq ;
(ii) E " ' has a unique zero in (0,*-) at pK ;
(iii) (E " ’ /E’ ) ((0 ,pq)) n <*” '/£• )((p*1 ,p M) = <!>
Consequently, E and its derivatives must look as follows:
V I « .
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The second and third derivatives of E can be seen below:
E
4
Example
The inverted Normal
£(0,p) = 1 — —  exp 
p '
where k is a constant, is of type T with h
{ - £ }2p 
and A V ? See section 3.4.2
for a polynomial example.
We shall require to use two other functions of derivatives of E , which are defined by
£"'(e,p)
Ä(e.p)
s(e,p)
fi'(e.p)g"(e,p)
(3.1)
(3.2)£”(e,p)
Let us examine the properties of each of these functions. Their behaviour in the
vicinity of p-q and p A is crucial for our analysis.
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3.2.2 Properties o f ft(0,p)
R1 R is symmetric about 0 - 0 ( since both E' and E‘ "  are antisymmetric
about the origin ).
R2
ft(0.p) <  0 for 0 '  ft < p\ 
m pK.p)  = 0
ft(0,p) >  0 for 0 > pA
R3
lim R (0,p ) e (p ) < 0
H -O
and
r(p) is an increasing function of p with 
lim e (p ) = —0
p -*
Proof Follows from continuity of ft . Since £'(0,p) is increasingly
"flat" as p increases by definition. c(p) is also strictly increas­
ing and approaches 0 from below.
R4 0 0 is a local minimum of ft(0,p) , for all p .
Proof Trivial by R1 and R2.
R5 ft is strictly increasing on (0.0, , where 0, and 0, are positive roots of
E ""(H ,p )  = 0 with 0, <  0,.
Proof Step 1 . Consider the region min(0,,pTi).
£” "(«.P ) -  ft(0.p)ft"(».p)
«• (0,p)
E" (O.p)
< 0  < = >  E " "  (0,p) -  ft(0.p)ft" («.p) >  0
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The first four derivatives of E can be seen below.
Case 0 , <  pt): 
(in)
(iv)
e, <  p K  <  0, at  E " "  I p K . p )  >  0  :
« ' (6,p) >  0 as E " " ( 0 , , p )  = 0 and R and E"  have opposite 
signs at 6, ;
f l ' ( e, p)> 0 on [p-n,ex] since E '"  is increasing and £T is 
decreasing there;
6, < e <  pi) = >  B " "  (0,p) >  0 
and A(0,p) £"(®.P) <  0 = >  « '(« .p ) >  0 .
For pi) <  9 <  0,, E "'  is decreasing slower than E" since E " "  
is increasing and E"  is decreasing. Thus ft'(0,p) >  0 .
Step 2 Consider region (0,0,) .
£""(e,p) .« " ( 0 , p )  = 0 < = >  ---------------  *  « ( « . P )
B"(0.P)
Therefore any turning point of R for 0 >  0 must lie on
( £ " " /£ ' '  ) (0,p) . Consider the shape of E " "  /E" . It is strictly 
increasing on (0,6,) . Thus R would have an even number of 
turning points to make sure 0 = 0 is a local minimum of R . 
But then not all turning points of R could lie on E " "  /E”  . 
Thus R touches £ " " / £ ”  at 0 = 0 and never meets it again in 
(0,6,).
Hence R (0,p) >  0 on (0,0,) .
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R6 Let q <  p .
Then R(S,î ) and R[0,p)  meet at a unique 6 = p-R{p?q) with
0  <  p -r {p '<i ) <
and
lim = qK
p-*
Proof Follows by R2 and R3.
We are now in position to sketch the pair of functions ft (8,q) in the region 0,6,
R £9 , <V i )
c, Ï • H
The behaviour of R for 8 >  6, is of minor interest to us. In fact, if E is of exponen­
tial type R will be always increasing, but if £  is a polynomial R may have another turn­
ing point.
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3.2.3 Properties of S(B.p)
SI 5 is antisymmetric about 8 = 0.
Proof E"  is symmetric and E' is antisymmetric.
S2
lim 5(6.p) + *
B O
S 3
5 (8 , p)  >  0 for B <  pr|
S(p»l.p) 0
5 (6 , p)  <  0 for B >  pr)
S4 5 is strictly decreasing on (O.pX
Proof Consider the region (O.pn . E"  is decreasing and E' is increas­
ing =  >  S is decreasing. Consider region pn,pX.
5'(B.p) = ft(B.p) -  [5(8,p )]* < 0  
since /i(8,p) <  0 on pn.Xp by R2.
55
56
57
S' (B,p) is an increasing function of B , for all p.
Let p <  q. Then 5(8,?) and 5(8.p) never meet in (O.pX) , and 
5(8,?) >  5(6,p), for all 8 c (O.pX)
The family of curves j 5(8.p) : p a 1 J is bounded from above by 5(8,*) 
defined by
5(8,*) = lim 5(6,p )
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See the diagram below.
S8 Let p <  q. Then 5(8,p) = —5 (8 ,9 ) has a unique root in (0 ,9 \) at
»  “  M-S( P ? )
with
s  M-s(P/ f )  s  P'1, for ail p 3: 9
In the same way as R , the behaviour of 5 for 8 >  pK depends on whether E  is 
exponential or polynomial. In the former case 5 has no further turning points, but in the 
latter case 5 will have another minimum and approach 0 thereafter.
3.3 The Main Problem
3.3.1 The Model
Our attention will be focused on the following model.
Let £(&,p) be of the type T. Consider the mixture
E  = a E ( 6  + i1 , p t ) + (I -  a )£ (5 -| i, p,) (3.3)
with O s a s  1 , p >  0 as control parameters and p, as the coefficients of spread.
Since only the relative sizes of p, and p, are relevant we shall concentrate on the 
case p, = 1 and p, = p .
Of course, by putting p, p2 p we reduce the problem to Smith’s Theorem. We 
shall refer to the general case as the "asymmetric mixture".
Our main strategy will be to search for cusps in the topology of the mixture. A mix­
ture is an example of a potential function and the importance of energy functions in sta­
tistical modelling cannot be overstated. Consider, for instance, the problem involving ran­
domised and mixture decision rules. Smith (25, pp.20-1) discusses the shape of the Pareto 
boundary in the rnultiperson decision-making context. Having pointed out that this boun­
dary need not, in general, be convex Smith lists conditions under which a set of mixture 
rules posesses a concave Pareto boundary. Under the same conditions Smith shows that 
randomised decision rules can occur if and only if a mixture rule exhibits a catastrophe.
Another application o f energy function is described by Zeeman, Harrison et at (29). 
In order to gain a fuller understanding and be in a position to interpret his model Zeeman 
searches for a cusp in the behaviour surface of his potential function. Both the qualitative 
and quantitative properties of his model are dependent on the existence and the location 
of the cusp point. The topology of mixtures is of vital importance in many statistical 
applications. Our aim is to describe a more general model than Smith s, which we believe 
has more practical importance.
3.3.2 Review of the Smith Method
We now state the result and proof of the simple case by adapting Smith s Theorem 
contained in Smith (24) to our notation.
Smith’s Theorem
Let £'(5,1) be of the type T and be written simply £(5). Then 
E <«£’ (fi + p.) + (1 -  u)£(5 —p.)
has a unique cusp at ( ft, <i, p ) ( 0, —, q ).
(3.4)
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Proof
If a cusp occurs at ft O, then the first three derivatives of E vanish at 
giving
AE' (p-t-fi) + £ ' ( 0  — p) 0
+ £ "  ( 0 - p )  = 0
A E '"  (p~f t )  + E " ’ ( 0 - p - )  = 0 
a
where A - , fi >  0.
1 -a
But E is symmetric about 0, and from diagram 1 it follows that
y4E'(p.~ft) £ ' ( p  — D )
AE"(fi.-ef>) = -  E "  ( p - O )
¿ £ • ' ( ( 1 * 6 )  = E " ' ( m. - D )
E(ft) has no stationary points in the region
Properties (i) and (ii) of type T functions imply u <  K (refer to diagram I)
Property (i) and equation (3.5.5) imply
(i -  D  s  q 
p. + O ^ r\
|o: lOl >  p }.
that point
(3.5.1)
(3.5.2)
(3.5.3)
(3.5.4)
(3.5.5)
(3.5.6)
(3.5.7)
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Property (ii) and equation (3.5.6) imply
M- + D <  \ (3.5.8)
Thus
M- -  0  € (O.q) (3.5.9)
(l + D € q.X)
Divide (3.5.6) by (3.5.4)
K ( p - O )  = « ( p ~ 0 )  (3.5.10)
Therefore property (iii) and equations (3.5.9) imply
p — 0  p  + D q
Therefore 0 ^ 0  is the necessary condition for a cusp in E (5) , and
p  = q
at the cusp point.
Now (3.5.4), (3.5.5), (3.5.6) become
(>» -  I)£T (p) = 0 (3.5.11)
(A + l)£ "(p ) 0 (3.5.12)
[A -  l )£ " '(p )  = 0 (3.5.13)
But £ '(p ) >  0 = >  A l = >  a  = — But A + 1 >  0 therefore
2
E "  (p) 0 -  >  p = q as required.
Therefore the cusp occurs at
( 6, a, p) = ( 0, 'n, q)
By the above method it is easy to first of all restrict the possible location of the cusp, 
and then pin point it using the third property of type T functions.
3.3.3 The Asymmetric Mixture using the Smith Method
There is no reason to suspect that the asymmetric mixture given by equation (3.3) 
should be of a different topological type than Smiths special case. We shall therefore 
search for a cusp point in it. Initially we apply the Smith method.
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Consider
E '(  fi) a£(fi + p,l) + ( l- « )£ ( f t -p ,p )  (3.6)
where E[0,q) is of type T.
If E (6) has a cusp at ft I) , then
A E ^  + D, 1) * E '(O -p .p ) = 0 (3.7.1)
AE"  (p -D .l)  + E" (£>-p,p) 0 (3.7.2)
A E " ( \ x  + D,\)  + E " ' [ D - t i , p )  0 (3.7.3)
u
where .4 --------- , p > 0 . But £(0,p) is symmetric at 0, for all p. Thus
1 -  u
/»£•'(p -O .l)  = £ '( p -0 ,p )  (3.7.4)
A E"  (p -  £>,l) -  E” (p -£>.p ) (3.7.5)
A E'"  (p~£>,l) = E "'  (\l — D ,p)  (3.7.6)
Search for cusps only in J £>: lOl 5 p j .
Property (i) of type T functions and equation (3.7.5) imply
p. *- D > q  (3.7.7)
M- -  D < pq
Property (ii) and equation (3.7.6) imply
(i +  D <  X (3.7.8)
We must distinguish between two cases:
(i) \ >  p i |
Then one of the following holds:
(a)
q <  p  -  0  <  p  + 0  <  p h  (3.7.9)
(b)
p  -  0  < q <  p  *- J3 <  *
(c)
q <  p  -  0  <  pq  <  p  + 0  < X
- 92 -
(ii) pii >  X
Then one of the following holds:
( a )
(3.7.10)
(b)
p. — D <  n <  |x + D <  K 
This difference can be seen on the following diagrams.
The green region of the 0 - axis signifies the possible placement of the p. -  D and 
p + D values.
So, summarising
i\ <  p. + D <  k (3.7.11)
p. -  D <  m i F i ( X , p ' n )
These inequalities are insufficient to pin point the p and 5 coordinates of the cusp.
Also, using (3.7.6) divided by (3.7.4), i.e.
« ( p  + D, 1) -  « ( p -0 ,p )  (3.7.12)
does not help, since for p * 1 we cannot apply property (iii) and this equation has many
•<0,p>
solutions.
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Therefore Smith’s approach fails to find the exact placement of the cusp. Neither 
does it disprove the existence of one.
3.3.4 The Geometric View of the Asymmetric Mixture
If the expected loss function given by (3.6) has a unique cusp point it must satisfy 
the set of equations (3.7.4), (3.7.5), (3.7.6) whether or not Smith’s method works. Let us 
examine these equations again.
Dividing (3.7.6) by (3.7.4) and (3.7.5) by (3.7.4) we obtain
fl(p + D,l) = « (n -D ,p )  (3.8r)
S (»i-D ,l) = -  5(m. - 0 ,p ) (3.8s)
If the cusp point exists at some (p.0,£>0) it must satisfy both of these equations simultane­
ously. From the properties of R and S discussed earlier we can produce a geometric view 
of the situation. The diagram 3.7 is the central part of our argument. Together with the 
analogous diagram of Smith’s special case it underlines the relative complexity of the gen­
eral problem and the restricted case.
dU«.^ 3 • ? : C+SL*. A > p
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The system of equations (3.8) has a solution (p0,Z)0) if it is possible to fit the corners 
of the rectangle width 2D0 to lie on the four relevant curves as pictured above.
We can use this method to solve Smith’s special case. System (3.8) reduces for p = 1 
to
ft(p+Z>) = K(p -  D) (3.9)
SfpL-rD) = -  S (p -O )
This gives the following diagram.
R(\l + D )  = K(p -  D)
S W  - - s (m-)
which gives a unique cusp at (fi = 0,p. = r\) for 6 c 0,x ) . Similarly for 6 <  0 we get 
another cusp at p. * -q .
The geometric approach gives a quick solution to Smith’s problem. We are now
ready to tackle the general case.
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3.3.5 The Existence and Uniqueness Theorem
Using the geometry of R and 5 functions we can determine the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique cusp point in the topology of the 
asymmetric mixture.
Lemma 1.1
p 5(p) is a continuous and increasing function of p , for all p s  I .
Proof
Follows directly from S8: qi\ s  ps (p/?) ^ pq, (or all p s  q .
Lemma 1.2
p R(p) >s a continuous and increasing function of p . for all p ^ 1.
Proof
The minimum of R, e(p), is an increasing function of p by R3. /f(0,p) is an 
increasing function of p for each Be 0,K . Since /?(0,1) is also increasing on 
that region, the intercept pR(p) is increasing. The continuity of pR(p) follows 
by R6:
0 <  p B(p) <  lim P « (p )  1 *
w -*
Theorem 1
Consider the system
E  (fi.p) uE(fi-*-p,l) + (1 — u )£ (ft-p .,p ) 
for a fixed p >  1, E  o f  type T, p  >  0 , 0 s  <* s  1.
Then e ‘ exhibits a cusp catastrophe with a unique cusp point over 
( fi, a ,  p ) < =  >
M-r(p) 2 M-s(p) (M)
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Proof
Consider solutions of equations (3.8r) and (3.8s) separately in the plane (p.,6).
• £ 0-4-
<>6 (■ * )
S 0
•¿r <• )
tksCcA . ^
The solutions of (s) are (xs (p) , Z)s(p)). They exist only for
k s ( p ) >  t * s ( p )  »>»<1 ^ s ( p )  >  0  • v s ( p ) ' 3 a n  increasing function of Ds [p). 
Similarly, the solutions of (r) are (v>R(p) , DR(p)). They exist only if 
vR (p ) <  M-r (p ) and kh(p ) is a decreasing function of £>R ( p ) .
y  r
Î • I o
Therefore a common solution exists < = >  M-« -  M-s , and it is unique.
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Corollary 1.1
The system (3.6) exhibits a cusp at D 0 ,
E' (Po-P)
&  (r 0’P) + (m-o*1)< " >  M-r ( p ) M-s ( p ) with M'o =  M-r (p )
Proof
Put 6 0 . (i m.0 m-r (p ) into (3.7.4) for the u -coordinate of the cusp point.
The condition (M) acts as a discriminant on the class of type T functions. It is 
not possible to prove from the given specifications whether or not (M) is an intrinsic 
property o f this class. Neither is it obvious that (VI) is independent of p . We may 
well have three subclasses among type T functions:
('•) - If F. t 7"m then (VI) holds for all p »  1 ;
(it) T „  p - If E  e Tm H then (VI) holds for all p < P  C 1,*)
(lit) V /  - If E  € Tm , then (VI) holds for <  >  p 1 .
Clearly, 7\, Q T„ P Q TM , C T , but nothing more strict can be induced in 
general.
We know that TM is not empty as it includes the Normal mixture.
Another issue to be resolved is the behaviour of the asymmetric mixture over 
the full ( p. , a , p ) control space.
Corollary 1.2
The cusp point coordinates (6 D m, a a) are continuous in p .
Proof
It is sufficient to prove continuity at p — 1 . The result follows from continuity of 
solutions of (3.8r) and (3.8s) and Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2.
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Corollary 1.3
The system (3.6) exhibits no higher order catastrophes than cusps over 
( p , a , p ) control space.
Proof
Let first E t . By Theorem 1 E (f>,p) exhibits a unique cusp in each p - sec­
tion of ( p , a , p ) . Corollary 1.2 states that the progress of the cusp points in 
the p-direction is continuous.
In order to display higher order catastrophes some section of the control space 
would have to have at least two isolated cusps in it. If E f Tw , then E can 
behave no worse.
P
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Above we picture the control space section (p,p) and the behaviour axis fi for 
the system (3.6) and E e TM. The line of cusps is continuous anil can never bifur­
cate. No other cusps can emerge at any other point. Thus there is no possibility of 
higher order catastrophes. Vet with three dimensions we would expert them. This 
leads us to
T h e o re m  2
The system (3.6) can be embedded in a control space of a Butterfly catastrophe 
by a projection
( p., a, p ) -  ( p., a, c = / (p \a,p), <f =<f0 < 0) 
where /  is some continuous function increasing in p 1 .
The last result says that an asymmetric mixture is basically a section of the 
Butterfly catastrophe. The constraint d d0 <  0 ensures that trimodality does not 
occur.
3 .3 .6  D igress ion : W h o  N eeds M ixtures?
L. Cobb (21) analyses topological complexities of mixture densities vis a vis 
multimodal densities in the extended Pearson family of distributions. In particular 
he notes that a mixture of j  components ( ,M] , say) requires a parameter space with 
.3j  — 1 dimensions, whereas the corresponding multimodal density with j  modes (A'; ) 
has codimension equal to only 2 j  .
In the language of Chapter 2 this simply says that if
E t K
determines a space of alternatives A and E is a mixture of j components Ek t E ,
k = 1,.... , j  with each Ek of type T, and
i i
£(x) = S a* *> x € IV
* - 1 * - 1
then (i) E has codimension 3j  -  1 whenever codimension |f,) s  2 , for all
k  .
- 1 (X) -
E exhibits at most j  modes.
Cobb suggests that E ran he replaced by another energy function, namely KJt 
which is topologically equivalent to an unfolding of a A 3Ij 1( singularity.* Kt 
requires only a 2( j  -  1) - dimensional control space and still displays up to j  modes.
It is questionable if this reduction in dimensionality is desirable. Obviously, 
from the point of view o f estimation, a considerable amount of work and time can be 
saved by using smaller parameter spaces. However, methodologically it is far more 
important to include all aspects to increase the model’s sensitivity.
Theorem 2 provides some clues. It is far wiser to treat ,U) as a special case of 
KJ , , rather than as an extension of . An arbitrary decision to use ,UJ creates an 
artificial restriction on the number of available modes in any modelling system.
E x a m p l e  1
Consider a Normal mixture model for beliefs ( R, P, T ) with
where X H , for all t € T .
VV e have reduced the parameter space to just ( m , a , t ) by eliminating the 
overall scale and location parameters.
In 3.4.1 we shall show that P c TM and so results from previous sections apply. 
Thus P displays a cusp singularity over (m, u) for each v -* I.
The corresponding Cobb density is the "Bimodal Normal" ,V3 defined by
P ,(X  x\m,v) un(m ,v)  -*■(!— u)n( —m,l)
/ 3(i|a,6) = eexp
and the effective codimension is 2. The "next up" Cobb density is ,VS,
/ 6(i |o,4,c,<<) * eexp
1 . .  t i , a— — z + — dxi *■ ~  e*3 bx + ax
« 4 3 2
(•) An unfolding of A J(j ,, ha» eodimrnsion 2j  -  2 and display» up to j  modes.
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Theorem 2 enables us to embed the control space of P within the control space of 
f  h. This may be advantageous for several reasons:
(i) The / 5 model is more general than P in the same way as P is more
general than f 3;
(ii) / s can be used as a test for trimodality and the appropriateness of 
a bimodal model;
(iii) Extended Pearson family densities are computationally easier to 
handle ( See Cobb (20)).
Example 2 Anorexia Nervosa
It has been interesting to monitor the progress made by catastrophists in their 
attempt to model the mental disorder known as Anorexia Nervosa. Mathemati­
cally the modelling went through three stages:
1. Cusp Catastrophe Model with a two-dimensional control space;
2. Butterfly Catastrophe Model with the control space expanded now 
to four dimensions. This development led to finding a cure for the 
illness, which could not be predicted in the bimodal structure 
offered by 1.
3 Et Catastrophe with five-dimensional control space and two-
dimensional behaviour space. In this way further aspects of the ill­
ness could be observed and dealt with.
The details of the work are described by Zeeman (16) and Calahan (1).
The two examples carry one important message. It often proves profitable to 
increase dimensionality of any model in order to include more aspects of the 
problem in question. Strangely enough a more general model may well provide a 
quicker answer.
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Define a relation ^ on elements of E by
E j ^ E2 <'=«> codim E i ^ codim E2
Then the relationship between a mixture and its "neighbouring” canonical 
models is
X, s  V/, * « i . .
It can never be a mistake to run K: t in parallel to ,UJ whenever a j  component 
mixture seems appropriate. In fact, since MJ is equipped to predict at most j  
modes, any Kk, with k >  j  can be tried if only in order to confirm validity of the 
\i) hypothesis.
The choice lies with the experimenter. Whenever speed is required Kl will do 
better than MJ. For an accurate analysis KJ , and higher order polynomials may 
often have to be employed.
Regardless of mathematical considerations mixtures possess many desirable 
properties useful in modelling aggregation and uncertainty problems. One particular 
advantage of an .1/^  model is the direct interpretation of parameters. For instance, 
the two - component mixture is generated by the natural parameters of location (p) , 
scale ( p ) and relative importance (u) . In a potential function of the cuspoid family 
these essential characteristics are sometimes difficult to isolate. The most interesting 
feature of the asymmetric mixture, the scale ratio p , is not an independent control 
factor of the Butterfly model and has to be expressed as a function of other parame­
ters. Yet, in a practical context, the behaviour of p may be of major interest. Indeed 
p may turn out to be much more tractable than the control parameters of the 
Butterfly.
The embedding in Theorem 2 is non - linear, consequently the parameter spaces 
of mixtures and multimodal densities not only differ in dimension but also in struc­
ture. Practical considerations will decide what type of model is chosen. In the next 
chapter we look at an aggregation model in an "industrial relations" setting ( see
- 103 -
page 129 ). One of the component models used is a mixture. It would be difficult and 
unwise to replace this mixture with a polynomial without losing the natural interpre­
tation of the parameters.
3.4 Examples o f  Type T  Functions
3.4.1 The Exponential Case: Normal Expected Loss
Let us look at Smith’s fundamental example and generalise it.
E(0,p) = 1 -  exp ( -  —  l (3.10)
p • '  2 p I
where p = k + V. (A:, V) are measures of spread of the loss and the belief functions 
respectively.
E is, of course, of type T and we can look at the mixture
E (fi) = «£ (*  + (4.^,) * (1 -  u)£(ft-p..p2) 
The bifurcation set and the cusp point of E are given by
(£ ) '(fi)  = ( £ > "(fi) (£)'"(f> ) = 0
First put
Thus £(6,p ) 
Note that
And so
C(0,p)
-  pG (0,p )
1
G '  (0,p) = -  —0C(0,p)
P
l I 02 )C ' ( 0 . p ) -  —  -  1 C ( 0 , p )p i p  I
1 ( 01 )
G "'(0 ,p )  —  30 -  —  C(».p)
p i  p '
E' (0,p) = 0C(0,p)
(3.3)
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E"  (e,p) = i -  - 0  |G(e,p)
' p
0 ( 0^
E’ "(e.p) = -  —  -  3 I G (0,p )
Thus E"  ( 0 , p ) has a unique a unique positive zero at 0  = V p . E " ' ( 0 , p )  has a 
unique positive zero at ft \ 3 p  .
We ran now calculate explicitly the functions R and 5 :
K(«.P)
5 | « , p )
E " ‘ ( f l ,p  ) | B^
E '  ( 6 , p )  I p
£ ” ( e . p )  1
(3.11)
(3.12)
£ ' ( B , p )  B p/f (B ,p ) is a  s im p le  p a r a b o la  a n d  it  s a tis fie s  a ll th e  p ro p e rtie s  d escribe d  in  s e c t io n  3 .1 . In fa c t  it  tu r n s  o u t t h a t  R h a s  e x a c t ly  o n e m in im u m  at B 0 , a n d  n o  o th e r  t u r n in g  p o in ts  a t  a ll .
S im i la r ly ,  5  b e h a v e s w ell in  th e  reg io n  B >  p q  , an d
1
lim 5  (B ,p  ) = —
p
1
So 5 is a hyperbola with asymptotes B 0 and 8 = — .
P
In order to check whether or not the Normal mixture exhibits a cusp catas- 
trophe we must examine the behaviour of p.H(p) and m-s(p ) -
Lemma 3.1
If E  is the Normal expected loss, then the condition (M) holds for all p >  I .
Proof
M-p(p) is the solution of
f t ( 8 , p )  = ft(0,l)
and by (3.11) we get
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Hence
M-r ( p ) =  \ /  " “P +  1
ps (p) is the solution of
S(e,p)  = -  5 (e , l )
and so (3.12) implies
JL H. 1
O p  0
2 '2Po ---------
p + l
giving
^s(p) \ /  ' 2P "
1 + p
Thus
M-«(P) >  O-s(p). oil p >  1
Theorem 3
If E is the Normal expected loss, then E , given by (3.6), exhibits a unique 
cusp in the half-plane p. >  0 for each p > 1.
Moreover, the ft -coordinate of the cusp point, D0 ^ 1.
Proof
The result follows immediately from Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 1.
£>0 /  0 follows from Corollary 1.1.
We achieve an intuitively appealing result in the Normal case: the cusp point 
moves away from the origin, but exists for all p . Hut we are still a long way from 
finding the explicit coordinates of the cusp point. To do this we must still solve
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f l ^  + 8,1) = ft(p-8,p) (3.8)
5(ti = S,l) = -  S( f i -R, p)
Using (3.11,3.12) and rearranging this reduces to
(8* -  p*)[(l -  p)8 -  (1 + p W  = 2p.p (3.13)
(8 -  p)2 -  3p -  p*[(8 + p)2 -  3]
The top one of these equations is a cubic in 8 and p and the two equations are 
very difficult to solve simultaneously. Once again let us compare the above set of 
equations with the reduced case p = 1:
p2 = 82 + 1 (3.14)
(8 -  p)2 = (8 + p)2
The top equation is now only a quadratic, and we quickly arrive at solutions
8 = 0, p = ±1
The general problem involves solving an equation one degree higher than in 
Smith's case.
3.4.2 The Polynomial Case
Let us now consider another expected loss function.
Define
2
p *  i (3.15)
p + *
F has certainly got the right shape and p plays the role of the coefficient of spread. 
This can be seen below.
M Z
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Lemma 4.1
F (z .p )  is of type T, for all p # 0.
Proof
(a)
(b)
(<•)
(d)
F is clearly C , symmetric, increasing in \z\ and bounded by 1.
x.p)
F "  (*.p)
(P2 + -tV
2p2(p2 -  3x2)
(p
Therefore F " (z ,p )  — 0 has a unique positive root at
P*  “  -  *  P l r
\ 3
r " ( z , p )
21P -r(-r -  P )
(P *2)4
Therefore F " '  (z,p) — 0 has a unique positive root at x = p = pAf
Note that
F  (J -P) 
P (*.p)
12(x2 -  p2)
(p2 - «V
(i) RF(z,p )  is increasing on O.p\y
(ii) Hy(z,p)  < 0  on O.pXyr] and Rr (pkF,p) = 0
(iii) RF( z ,p ) >  0 for z >  pKF.
(«').(*'*'),(i” ) fli -( (0.pTif- ) ) n / f r ( ( P Tl p - P V ) )  = *
We have to examine the properties of RF and SF(x,p) *  F" (x.p) to determine 
the existence of a cusp point in
F (i)  u f ’ (i + fi,l) + (1 -  aJPIx-p.p) (3.16)
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We know that
Lemma 4.2
Rr [z,p)
SF (z ,p )
12(x2 -  p2)
( P J  +  «V
P* ~ 3a 1  * ( P *  +  * * )
H« (p ) = M-s (p ) . lor all p .P" r
Proof
To find puR (p) we must solver
Rr (z ,p )  ftF(i,l)
which gives
12(»8 -  p2) 12(x2 -  1)
( p 2 *  x 2 )2 (1 +  x 2 ) 2
Hence
3 x 4 +  x 2( l  +  p 2 ) — p 2 0
with solutions
*’ « - ^ ( < 1  + Pl ) -  V(l  + p Y  + 12p2 |
This gives two real solutions and the positive one of those is the required
M-r  ( p ) =  r  |^ ( 1  *  p 2 )* +  1 2 p *  -  ( i +  p 2 )|
'  V6
To find p.5 (p) consider
SF (*-P)  = ~ s f  (*.P)  
i.e.
a , 1 , ,  ap — 3x 1 — 3x
3x4 + x2(l + p2) — p2 3 0
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
Hence
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which is the same equation as (3.19).
M-r  (p ) =  M-s > for PF" F1
The functions RF and SF look as follows: Take q >  p .
It can be shown that SF (z,p) never meets SF ( i , q )  if p # q :
Suppose the contrary. Then* ~ a a .  ap  — 3 i q — 3 x
= for t o m e  x  > 01 2  2 2 p + 2 q t- *
Hence 2
2 2 2 24p z = 4 q X < =  >  x  = 0 or p = q , con tra d ic t ion .
Notice that and behave differently for large z than do their exponential 
counterparts. Because of the tail behaviour of the expected loss functions the polyno­
mial functions are bounded, while the exponential ones are not.
We can now draw the obvious conclusion.
Theorem 4
F defined by (3.16) exhibits a unique cusp in the half plane p. >  0 for every 
p >  1 . The coordinates of the cusp point are
- no -
- I l l  -
and
> 0, for all p
i.e.
g ip ) • 0 at p — 7c
M-o(P) -  1 p -
We finally have an example where the exact coordinates of the cusp point ran 
be found explicitly, for all p .
3.5 Conclusions
The attempt to analyse the properties of the asymmetric mixture has been par­
tially successful. The problem is far more complicated than it appears at a first 
glance. The relative complexity of the general situation compared to Smith's special 
case is best summarised by diagrams 3.7 and 3.8. While in Smith’s case the solution 
is simply forced upon us the general picture yields little or no clues of how to 
proceed.
But the geometry of this system affords us at least the possibility of finding a 
relatively simple necessary and sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of 
cusp singularity. The proof is based on a purely geometric argument and does not 
give us the explicit coordinates of the cusp point. It may well be that the most gen­
eral case will not yield these coordinates.
Looking at the special cases the situation improves only slightly. The extension 
of the fundamental example used by Smith behaves as badly as the general case. We 
can obtain the equations of the bifurcation set and the cusp point, but they are very 
awkward to solve. We do know that a solution exists, if that is any consolation.
Perhaps the most important benefit of looking at the extended problem is 
focused in Theorem 2. The increase in the dimension of the control space enables us 
to embed a 2-component mixture into the Butterfly potential function, and, in
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general, to relate an model to the cuspoid family.
Whenever a mixture is fitted to a problem it is wise to be aware of the fact that 
restricts us to just j  modes and may sometimes suppress a few others.
»<•
4. A ggregate Decision M aking and C onflict
4.1 Motivation
The recipe suggested in 2.6.3 can readily be applied to Decision Theory. There 
appears to be a greater need for new methodology here than in the abstract Probability 
Theory. Computationally we face fewer difficulties since normalising constants are of no 
importance. No major inroads have been made into classifying utility and expected utility 
functions, therefore Decision Theory foundations seem more recipient to new approaches. 
Pragmatists will no doubt be more interested in getting some quick decisions out of their 
models, and our methods set out to achieve this task. At first glance the mathematical 
techniques may appear cumbersome, but the routines are easy to apply. And, of course, 
we believe they provide accurate modelling facilities.
The models used in this chapter consist of the usual triple
( W, E, T )
where E is invariably an expected loss function, parametrised by a subset of /?' , yielding 
a decision space D as its space of alternatives. Most often we have
D C W = K
The aggregation function is introduced in the decision theoretic context and is a res­
tricted case of the map defined in 2.6.3.
4.2 The General Scheme
4.2.1 Introduction
The method presented here is designed to provide a practical tool for aggregating 
decisions in conflict situations.
By "aggregation" is meant both the problem of amalgamating separate decisions 
processes into one resultant action as well as combining several attributes of a single deci­
sion. "Conflict" is handled using Catastrophe Theory in its simplest form.
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4.2.2 The Scheme
Consider a class of real-valued, C* expected loss functions written in the form
E 4, x V, -  R
WLOG assume i t |l,....nj throughout. A t are the decision spaces and Vt are the
environment spaces.
We proceed using the ideas from 2.6.3, and consequently the aggregation procedure 
is based on the assumption that the above loss functions can be represented by a single 
expected loss of the same structure:
E-. X  x IV • rt
where .V is the decision space and IV , the environment space, is constructed from all the
K  ’s.
In general, no restriction is made to the dimension of any of the decision spaces or 
the environment spaces. However, for simplicity, the rest of the scheme will be presented 
under the assumption that the decision spaces are all one dimensional.
The process then consists of three stages.
(1) Local Optimisation
Define a dynamic associated with each expected loss function Et by 
da, ¡1 £,(»,, a.)
----- -  -------------- (4.0)
dt ria(
a, € At, », c V'
Then each Et is optimised using a map
opHE,) : V, ■ A,
defined by
opt[E,) = a, (w.)
where at is an attractor of (4.0). Write
opt = ( opf(£,), • • • , opt(En) )
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o p t  : Vj x • • • x  V, -  i l ,  X • • • x An
( 2 )  A g g r e g a t i o n
To construct W we begin by combining the environment spaces
V'...........v . -
* : y  i * • • ' * * V,
Then put V = Vt V0 where V0 is an environment space disjoint from 
V V
The aggregating function <r maps local decision spaces onto the control 
space of E :
ir :  . 4 ,  X  • • • x An x V -  W
The aggregation is completed by combining <r with the local optimisa­
tion operator opt :
i t  < r . ( o p t .  i d )  :  V ,  X  • • • x Vn x V -  W
(3) Final Optimisation
Lastly, by defining a dynamic on X  , analogous to (4.0), we optimise E 
to obtain the final decision x :
opt(E) : W - X  
opt[E) = X (<«) , U> € IV
t
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Example
A decision maker, D , intends to use advice of two subordinates A and B to reach a
decision z t X  -  R . He constructs an expected loss function of the form
E: X  x V -  R
where V is the environment space. V consists of:
(i) D ’s own preferences and beliefs about the problem;
(ii) Information about A 's and B ’s preferences and beliefs;
(iii) ( a , 6 ) , the actions advised by A and B .
Notice that it is not necessary for D to have the complete knowledge of (i), (ii) and (iii) in 
order to construct V and hence E . If, however , all information is available D proceeds 
according to the outlined scheme.
4.2.3 Summary and Comments
The scheme described here can be summarised by a diagram.
A. \> — W X
Thus the whole process can be written as
opt.,T.(opt, id) : Vt x • • • Vm x ( [m (*) (J  V0 ) ~ X
where Im denotes the image of a map.
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While <r has been called the aggregating function, c can be regarded as the influence 
map. If we view the aggregator as a person distinct from the re decision makers then 
when viewed as follows the construction of W has some intuitive appeal. V is the the con­
trol space of the aggregation function. It consists of two components: V\ =  "aggregator’s 
perception of decision maker’s environment", and VQ =  "aggregator’s independent 
environment".
In most aggregation schemes V and A , x • • • x An would now be sufficient to pro­
duce the final decision. We introduce one extra stage and use <r to construct a control 
space of the final decision process.
If the development of the process is viewed over time, clearly we will require 
( K0 x K, x . . .  x Vm ),, ,
to be dependent on x, In this way the cycle is completed. Notice that environmental 
spaces and decision spaces interact in both directions.
The ultimate aim must be the classification of all processes of the above type. The 
method is determined by properties of <r and €. In particular the part played by <r is of 
major importance. In this work we shall only look at very simple cases, and distinguish 
two major types according to the dimension of Im (<r) .
Evolution over time is another important aspect.
The T element of the triple is designed to take care o f that. Two cases are to be con­
sidered:
(i) the development of a model over time,
and
(ii) the sequential aggregation using the same model.
Within the energy approach such analysis becomes possible.
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Finally, a word must be said about the practical context of our scheme. The general 
description does not state who is doing the actual aggregating. French (45) has listed four 
types of aggregation problems (see page 76), and the reader will no doubt wonder which 
case we are covering. In short the answer is "All of them". Our aggregating function ir is 
designed to construct a control space W for any of the problems listed by French. Hut. of 
course, the exact form of <r and the structure of the enviroment spaces will reflect the 
practiacl context. For instance, if we are dealing with the "Expert Problem" the energy 
function
E: X  x W - R
will represent the expected loss function of the external investigator. IV  will be con­
structed from the decisions of the contributing experts as well as from other information 
available to the aggregator and contained in V'0. The particular form of
A ,  x  • • • x  A h x  ( V, ( J  V0 ) -  W  
will be chosen by the aggregator.
In other situations, such as the "Textbook Problem", the choice of <r and the com­
plexity of W are the responsibility of the whole group.
So far we have presented a general outline of our scheme. We now turn to look at 
some more specific situations.
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4.3 Cusp Aggregation Rules
4.3.1 Definition o f a Catastrophic Aggregation Rule
Following the notation of the previous section let E ,, . . . , En be a set of C 
expected loss functions
Et : A t x F, - li t = l,...,n 
Let
E : X  x W -  H
be their aggregate expected loss, and let W be constructed according to the same scheme 
with
i t  : A ,  x • • • x A n  x V  - W '
as the aggregating function. Viewing E as a potential function we can classify i t  -  func­
tions according to the topological type of E .
Definition
i t  is called a Catastrophic Aggregation Rule if
dim i  2  1 and dim W z  2
Thus in particular, <r is a
(i) Cusp Aggregation Rule (CAR) if
dim X  1, dim W 2
(ii) ButterHy Aggregation Rule (BAR) if
dim X  — 1, dim W = \
etc.
At present no attempt will be made to examine any more complicated rules such as 
the Umbilics or the Double Cusp.
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4.3.2 Standard Aggregation Rule
Let F ' ( p , R ) be any continuous multivariate belief function of a parameter 0 
with mean p an n x l column vector and covariance matrix R .
Let L (a — 0 . V ) be an associated loss function, a c A being the action spare. 
Suppose, VVLOG, that the n marginal distributions combine with n respective margi­
nal loss functions to produce n expected loss functions, which are all C ‘ . Call these
where f is a polynomial in (a -  p) and P is its spread matrix constructed from R and V .
optimisation. (4.2) will help us to construct V . Then we shall choose a <r to complete the 
process.
Suppose additionally that the optimisation on El,...,En gives
opt p
Meanwhile, the multivariate expected loss function is of the form
(4.1)
Call P ' the interaction matrix of the process.
We wish to aggregate the actions of the n decision makers. (4.1) gives us the local
Let
E: X  x W -  R
be the aggregate expected loss function.
Define
v. = (P , R). V0 = («*„, b0)
Now let ir : Ax V - W be a CAR
Thus W = (a, b) , say
Definition
Call ir a standard CAR if
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a “  1r R *(a — a) + a0
ft = (a — a)TP '(a — a) + ft„
(4.3)
a is going to play the role of the normal factor, and ft is going to be the splitting fac­
tor.
Properties o f the Normal Case 
Using the same notation, put
F =  Multivariate Normal 
L =  Multivariate Conjugate Normal Loss
Let us examine a couple of simple situations. Some of the examples presented below 
display a number of desirable properties. For instance, in case (1) we end up with an
contributors. Thus our model analyses the problem in a higher dimension. A similar
we arrive at is sensitive to interactions between the contributors due to an introduction of 
non-zero correlations into their joint belief and loss structures.
It can be shown that
P = R + V
so that ( 1.3) becomes
a ~ i r R *(a — a) + a0
ft = (a -  a)T(R + V) '(a -  ¿) + 60
(4.1)
expanded version of the linear opinion pool ( c.f. Me Conway (18)). Not only do we obtain
a consensus distribution but we can also keep track of the amount of dissent among the
approach in case (2) gives rise to a more general version of the Smith model. The solution
(1) Beliefs and Losses uncorrelated, i.e. R and V diagonal. Then (4.4) becomes
R = diag ( r, ), V dlag  ( )
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We further simplify by taking opt (p,, . . . , pn) with p 0 . Then
is the final form of <r .
This model has the following properties:
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1. (a) If ri and are large then in the limit
(a,6) = (aa,60)
In other words, the aggregator takes little notice of the contributors 
whenever their beliefs lack precision;
(b) But, if instead, rt and vi are small (a,6) may end up very far from
(a0,60) . In this case the aggregator disregards his ow n biases.
So if the contributors base their beliefs on observations from, say, 
some DLM with precisions increasing in time a situation of type (a) 
may evolve into one of type (b).
2. Suppose additionally ri = r for all i .
Then
a = a0
The aggregator is not going to lean towards any particular section of 
contributors under this restriction.
The amount of conflict in the model will depend directly on
• -1
So we are really considering the distribution of the vector p . Aggrega­
tor treats the inputs as data. Removing the restriction p -- 0 , the pair
is treated as a summary of the group’s intentions and inner conflict. 
There is nothing particularly new about looking at such a summary. 
What is novel is the idea of treating the components of the summary as 
control factors of the cusp potential function. Precisions act as weigh­
ing coefficients. Note that the method can be used when nothing at all 
is known about the manner in which the contributors arrived at their 
individual decisions. For instance, if the aggregator is given
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( (1, , . . . , M-. )
as his only data, he can still construct a model of the form
a = c,p . + a0
• - I
The constants c, and e2 calibrate the potential function and. in some 
respect, represent the aggregator’s dependence on his contributors.
3. If the tolerance to losses, c, , is large the effect is similar to the earlier
case when (v, + r,) was large. Essentially 6 will lie close to 60 . Clearly 
if the contributors have large margins for error it is unlikely that much 
conHict between them can develop.
(2) n 2 , Beliefs and Losses correlated.S a y
R = 
R 1
i<r, p<r,(r2
P«Vri . r2
1
. r . V ^ l  -  p J )
V =
w ith  — 1 <  p <  l
<r2 2 ” P«*yr2
-p<rl<r2 <rj2
bkv k2 
k *
P l  P 12 
PII PiP i “ P l l  " P i !  Pl
Hence <r gives (4.4) as
(a, -  a ) (a , -  a )
a = + +■ a0" t  (* ~ P ) <*■ » (1 ~ P )
4 = |(<ri !' + 0 ( ° l  ~ ■ )* “  2(P,r l ,r l  + fi* l* !) ( “ l 
+ (<r,2 + k * ) [ a t  -  S)*|/ |(1 -  p'^r^.r,*
<0(°i “  “ )
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+ (1 — ft2)kl2kt 2 + * ,2<rj2 + *22<r,2 — 2pf>/fc1 *2<ri<r2^  + b 0  
The last result looks more interesting if we further simplify by putting
Then
gives
o p t  ( p , - p )
k .  k  n
<r op t.tr
(4.5)
b  = 2 p 2 /  [(1 -  p)cr2 +  (1 -  fi)*2| +  b 0
Note that equation (4.5) generalises Smith’s Theorem to the case of correlated
beliefs and losses. If we put p = S = 0 , a0 = 21og (-------- ) , 60 = — 1 we obtain
1 -  a
his result
a
6
2 log
1 -  a
2p -  1
So, the rule proposed here produces a recognised result as a special case. We can 
isolate the following main properties of the above model:
1. o0 represents the aggregator’s initial bias towards either contributor. This
bias is quite independent from the usual weighting factors since we have 
assumed <r, — <rt ir .
2. The splitting factor is clearly a function of p, p, f t ,  i t 2 .  k~ with the following 
properties:
(a) If <r2 and k2 are very large 6 will lie close to 40 as in the previous exam-
phi
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(b) If the denominator in the equation for 6 is constant, then 6 will clearly 
be an increasing function of p as in Smith’s original model and all our 
earlier cases;
(c) We must examine carefully the sensitivity of the model to changes in ft 
and p .
C>) ft = constant <£ 1. Then
6 = ^
(l-p)<r2 + e
Thus
O 2 0 22 H 2m-s  6 s
2 <rJ + c c
Therefore b is increasing with p . So for a constant value of p. the 
splitting factor increases with correlation. This is what we would 
expect: a difference in opinion ( p ) is more likely in the absence of 
correlation, therefore the conflict is greater if differences occur 
among correlated contributors;
(H) 6 = 1 .  Now
2M----- s  6 s  x.2<r
If the contributors have perfectly correlated loss structures and 
still produce different conclusions we can face an enormous conflict 
with
(iii)
lim 6 (p) = *
Analogous analysis holds when p is held constant;
(iv) When 6 p = 0 the model is reduced to Smith’s s mixture.
(3) 3 , two correlated contributors.
Suppose the beliefs and losses have the following spread matrices:
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Then the interaction matrix is the
0 0
2cr 2per
2per 2cr
0 0
2V ftt;2
ftt/2 2V
inverse of
where
P = R
x (ct2 +  V 2 )
2 , ~ 2per + 5 v
z —
2  2
(T  +  V
Thus —1 ^ x <1 as a function of p and ft .
Hence the Standard CAR model for the situation takes form
P'1 M-2 +  P'3
cj2 <r2(l + p)
2 2 , 2 0 
P'1 P’2 ^  P ’3  ”  2 x p . 2 p .3
6 = +2 , 2 / 2 , 2 vcr + v (cr + v )(1 — x )
where opt = ( p.t, p.2, p.3 ) and ¿1 = 0.
The dependence of x on p and ft is portrayed below:
Let us consider the properties of this particular model. Denote by Ai the indivi-
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dual contributors taking decisions a-, «=1,2,3 , respectively.
a is a decreasing function of p with
M-l M-j + M-j
lira o(p) = —“  + T 
r-i <r 2<t
and
lim o(p) = —*
p- *
The normal factor was not affected by correlation in our previous case, but 
this time p affects the weights attached to the opinion of each contributor. 
The aggregator intends to give progressively less weight to the opinions of 
A 3 and A 3 as p increases. When p = 1 he treats their inputs as one by 
averaging them. However if p <  0 their opinions gain extra strength. Ulti­
mately, there is a heavy bias towards A 2 and A 3 if they are of the same 
sign. Note that when p = 0 we are back at the general uncorrelated situa­
tion when the usual weighted average of all three inputs is taken.
The correlation coefficient x affects only the second component of 6 .
Case p., ”  p-3 .
Now
a
b
(«T* + »“Ml + x)
^ ' 2.
x
Thus when
x = -1  : we face imminent conflict;
x = 0 : usual uncorrelated situation;
x = 1 : we treat A t and A 3 as a single contributor.
Case p., = -  M-» •
Then
2
b
2 2 (<r* + «*)(! -  x)
This produces a reflection of the last picture:
In particular
x = — l : A 2 and A 3 are treated as one; 
x = 0 : standard uncorrelated case; 
x -  1 : conflict is imminent.
General case: WLOG take p2 > p,3 >  0 .
The conflict is minimal at x = —  .
If x = 1 or -1  we face an imminent conflict as the situation is explosi
X
4
x
irrespective of the current choices of p.2 and p.3 .
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4.3.3. Simple Projection Rule
With identical notation as in previous chapters consider again the set of n expected 
loss functions
E i : A t[ X V i -  R  i = l,...,n
Similarly let
cr : .4, X ••• x X V  -  W
be the aggregating function, and let V be constructed as before.
Definition
cr is called a projection rule if
(i) dim W = n
(ii) W = (io1,...,wB) and to, = cr, ( a,,p,) where
o, « A ,
„  P l Pi]P = n X n
P„ Pn .
is the interaction matrix and <r = (<r,, . . . ,<r„) .
Thus the projection rule is used when there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
each component decision and one control factor. In such cases we can loosely speak of 
"independent" contributions of n decision makers.
Definition
If cr is a projection rule then it is called simple if additionally each cr, is a linear func­
tion of a,,
“  P.a. + °.o  ,' = 1..... n
Clearly, the topology of the projection rules is only dependent on the number n of 
decision makers.
In this chapter we only look at the cusp rules, so we consider the case a 2 .
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Let Ei : At x Vi -  H i 1,2 , and WLOG put
Pi 0
0 p2
as the interaction matrix. Define ir : > ¿1, x V -  W by
“ iPi
U2p2 ]
where W = (a. P)
. c o s 0  sin O  I 
Au = 1
— sinO  cosO  *
V = (P ,9), 0 € V0
The rotation matrix is introduced in order to allow the aggregator the choice in the 
angle of projection of the two contributing decisions onto his control space.
Example Simulation : Demand v. Industrial Unrest 
Introduction
Background : Suppose we wish to construct a model of an industrial conflict. Typi­
cally we consider a factory with a sizable work force. We are interested in the dependence 
of output of the plant on the demand and the state of industrial relations.
The object of the exercise is to enable any participant in an industrial dispute to 
monitor the situation. Thus the management, the unions and the government should be 
able to use the model presented below. The conclusions each might draw from it could, of 
course, be quite different.
For the sake of consistency the reader may assume that this model has been con­
structed by the management as a means to anticipate and control strike situations.
The demand is the easier of the two factors to monitor. We are going to measure it 
in terms of orders received by the company. To quantify industrial relations we introduce 
the concept of industrial unrest ( IU ). This factor is much harder to measure. Intuitively, 
IU represents the level of dissatisfaction with the management and general conditions felt
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by the work force.
Initially we intend to look at two other factors which inthience the output and 
describe the effect of demand and attitudes of the workers. One such factor we will refer 
to as "pressure". It measures the amount of power, influence and desire for change felt by 
the work force. The other aspect is "intensity", and it describes the strength of feeling 
about any issue faced by the workers.
Our "empirical" control factors of demand and industrial unrest can be related to 
"pressure" and "intensity". We first make the following observations:
(i) When demand is constant an increase in IU corresponds to a drop in out­
put. Initially the decrease in production is smooth and hardly noticeable. 
But when IU reaches a sufficiently high level the response of the output is 
often discontinuous.
(ii) With a constant level of IU a rise in demand leads to an increase in the 
power of the work force and hence to a corresponding increase in "pres­
sure".
This type of behaviour - control interdependence has often been modelled by a cusp 
catastrophe potential. Sussmann (27) has heavily criticised this approach, but we will per­
sist with it because the Cusp provides a simple anil effective geometric interpretation of 
the problem. Our model must be seen as no more than a "first approximation". An 
interpretation with a more developed control space will undoubtedly paint a more accu­
rate picture. But it will still retain many of the basic features of the cusp model. The res­
tricted case we present here is primarily designed to illustrate the potential of our aggre­
gation technique.
The model we are proposing is empirically testable. The "demand" and IU factors 
can be quantified along the lines indicated in models A, and Aj below. The aggregation is 
then achieved by a straightforward application of the projection rule. A strike can then be 
predicted by examining the evolution of the parameters of the aggregated potential.
0
- I30bis -
The Model : The Cusp Catastrophe has a 2 - dimensional control space. In order to 
model output as a function of only two factors we must relate the four concepts defined 
above to each other.
We postulate
(1) The effect of "pressure" and "intensity" is orthogonal;
(2) "Pressure" and "intensity" are both increasing functions of demand;
(3) IU is an increasing function of "intensity" but a decreasing function of
pressure".
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Consequently the reduced control space looks as follows:
The energy function we are going to use is equivalent to the Canonical Cusp Catas­
trophe and is given by
E (x ) = 1 — i(a,6)exp| — [~ x* — —bx2 — ax!
I 4 2
with
x =  output meeting quality standards
and C  = (a,6) , is the control space, where
a =  "pressure" - Normal factor;
b =  "intensity" - Splitting factor.
The postulates (2) and (3) then imply 
id  —  a + 6 =  demand
u — b  -  a =  industrial unrest
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The proposed model is shown below.
10»
The bifurcation set of the model defines the conflict region of the dispute. A discon-
tinuity of output corresponds to either a strike or a return to work.
We investigate u and <u separately and then aggregate using a simple projection rule.
Model A , - Demand
Assuming a "business cycle" of, say, 4 years we can model the demand using a Sea­
sonal DLM. Let
y, =  orders ( or log orders )
8lt =  underlying market demand
Then put
y, = (1,0)6, + v, ‘ Af(0; V)
]•« , +
86, * A [ 0 ; V , ]
where
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and 27T<f> T -  4 years . 
Updating
where
( I ) - jv ; c t
= nl cos<f) + bt jsincf) + A l.iet
= -n t jsinif) ■+■ bt jC O S c f)  + i t
C, = ft - \ Y t A /
— Var ril r  I 2ft L 1 Dt , SB
IP, ) r2l r 2 2
Yt Var(yt I D, ,) = r,, + V
€ t Ift ~  Vt ~  y t  ~  n t i cos<i> ~  bt jsin<f>
I4 'I  (r"  I / YU j t |r,J *
Hence
rn
nt = nt icos<t> + bt jsinif) + (yt — nt jCos<t> — bt ,siruf))
rn + v
Also
with
Ct -  «  -  At YtAt T C jj
Therefore observer’s beliefs about the level of demand, 0,, , at time t , are
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Using the conjugate normal loss function of the form
¿(o,,e) 1 -  exp | -  ^ - ( 0  -  ai)2J (*)
where 0 = 0j , at € A t is the observer’s decision about the demand level and kx is a con­
stant which in practice depends on profit margins.
We obtain the expected loss function
ki ( l
£|(a,) 1 -  ( ) exp] -  (a, -  n, )2
*. + C n I kt + c „
where
« v i
the environment space.
If no component of Vt is dependent on a,, the optimisation gives
opt(Ei) a ,, = n,
M odel A 2 : Industrial Unrest 
Industrial disputes arise when conflicting interests of the management and the work 
force attain a sufficiently high level. To model the development of industrial unrest let 
<bt =  level of industrial conflict at time t .
We postulate that <t>, is a bimodal function, and the two modes correspond to the 
interests of each competing group. The separation of the two modes represents the split 
between the two sides and the height of the modes illustrates their relative power. 
Therefore we can use a mixture to model <t>, :
<f>( + (1 -  a,)yV(-p.t;Ct)
"alienation or polarisation" between the management and the work 
force;
"relative influence" or support for each side;
where
=
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Ct =  sharpness of views or determination of each group.
Note that more generally the scale parameters of each mixture component could be 
different. In that case an asymmetric mixture would have to be used.
The bimodal structure of A, allows us to monitor sudden changes of moods and atti­
tudes of either side.
The estimation of all the parameters can be done by either a survey or a study of 
various data such as absenteeism ( see, for instance, Zeeman (29) ).
Using a loss function analogous to (*) we obtain a weighted conjugate normal 
expected loss
= “ i
(a ~ Up* I
*2 + Ct '
(1
(a * M-t)2 1
(*, + Ct ) )
where o2 € A 2 is the observer's decision about the level of industrial conHict, and
v 2 = € V 2
is the environment. If all components of V2 are independent of a2, then the optimisation 
gives
°P  =  a 2.t ( " 2 )
and a need not be single-valued nor continuous function of v2 .
Aggregation
In order to combine models A t and A 2 we must first construct V'.
Take V = Vt [_) V0 with Vt I* , V, (al0, a20) the interaction matrix. Since we 
have assumed independence of models A t and A t , P will be diagonal:
*1 + C i\ 0P 0
*2 + C,
P i 0
0  p2
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Now our model for the aggregate expected loss function is
where
E : X  x W -  ft
i t  : /t, x A 2 x V -  W
is a simple projection rule, thus requiring
with
W = ( o, b )
where
a "pressure",
fr = "intensity",
u, = demand,
u = industrial unrest.
In this way we have constructed a model oi an industrial situation by Rrst examming 
each control variable separately. The controls ( a. 6) have been introduce because of 
their natural interpretation as normal and splitting factors of the canomCa| cusp catas_ 
trophe. The components ( o.. u ) , on the other hand, are easier to estimate ,n practlce.
We have assumed a smooth development of the market leading to a continuous 
demand curve. This assumption can be relaxed without altering the global structure oi the 
model. Yet we have allowed a discontinuous contribution from the indvl8tr-|a| re|atlons 
aspect. The "double jump" effect is known as a e<uea.dint eatattropht and is a|most impos­
sible to track in any other way. In industrial relations literature such a phenomena are 
called "wild - cat strikes" ( see Lane (5) ).
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A possible dynamic associated with this type of dispute is shown below.
‘,'dc
Even though the demand remains steady, a sudden deterioration of industrial rela­
tions displaces the system from A deeply into the conflict zone at B . A failure of initial 
negotiations is now sufficient to spark off a strike at C . A "wild cat" dispute is character­
ised by a direct jump from A' over the threshold to C  .
An afterthought : An "inverted", or Dual, Cusp Model we have introduced in 2.4.4 
can be used to devise an alternative model of industrial conflict.
Consider the differential equation 
dG
-----  = -  i ( *  -  P,)(* ~  <f|) “  0
dz
G exhibits a unique minimum at z * p, . By interpreting * as the output, d, as the 
demand and pt as the level o f  induetrial cooperation ( effectively — IU ), then G can be
used as an energy function for our problem.
The factory produces at the minimum of G . Thus if pt s  0 there is a standstill of 
production. The output reaches the full capacity when p, ?  J, . The development of p, 
and dt need not be continuous.
4.3.4 Double Conflict
Let E t and E2 be two expected loss functions, both with topological structure 
equivalent to that of a canonical cusp catastrophe.
Aggregating such expected losses may be of great interest in many practical contexts 
where each contributor faces internal conflict of his own even before confronting his 
adversary.
Clearly in this situation
opt :
may be a discontinuous function on some regions of Vt x V2 .
We shall model the aggregation process using a CAR: 
cr : 4 , x ^ j X  V' -  W  = (o,6)
where V is constructed from V, and V2 . Let P be the interaction matrix for £, , E2. 
The methods discussed earlier yield two possible candidates for ir : the standard and the 
projection rule.
Let us however look at another possible rule.
Internal and External Conflict
WLOG suppose that Ex : Vx x Ax -  R is given by
£ .(°.) • 1 -  * K .P > * p j  -  [ - « /  -  “ P.a.2 ~ a .°ilJ (4.6)
where
V , -  ( a ,  . 0 . )  . =  1.2
The expected loss (4.6) is essentially a cusp catastrophe potential function.
Definition
Internal conflict (1C) for Ex is defined by
-ItH tI'
Clearly if 6, <  0 , Et is unimodal, etc.
Definition
External conflict (EC) between Et and E2 is defined by
A = (a — aj^P '(a  — a)
Thus A : V', x V2 -  (W »  0), and, due to properties of £ , and EJX may well be a 
discontinuous function on some regions of Vt x V2 ( where f>x > 0 ).
Total Conflict
As lm <r is two dimensional we require two control factors. One of them will prob­
ably be the average level of decision, the other will have to be related to the conflicts in 
the system.
By Total C o n f l i c t  (TC) we will mean the splitting factor o f the aggregate expected 
loss. This total conflict will obviously spring out from the two types of conflict defined 
above.
The table below indicates an intuitive relationship between the three types of
conflict.
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External + 0 + o +
Internal + + 0 0
Total + + + + 0 + +
where + — 
0 =
high positive 
high negative 
no conflict
conflict
conflict
Graphically this relationship should look something like this:
1 0 foi. L
©CO«*. ^  ^  ■ 5*
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Thus when internal conflict is negative there are two possibilities for total conflict depend 
ing on the sign of the external conflict.
T*o^cd.
Combining these two graphs we get
Consider the following function:
*»*(*.») e + « + I , y 2 0 (4.7)
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It has roughly the required shape if we put
z = internal conflict
y external conflict
x total conflict
Also there seems to exist a natural interpretation for each element of (4.7). Clearly <* 
and e* measure the contribution of each type of conflict, while t measures the contri­
bution of the interacted conflicts. The latter term is only significant when large y "meets" 
negative x , which seems quite natural.
Aggregation
We propose the following ir to be used in double conflict situations.
<r : A ,x A ,x  V -  W = (a,*)
where p and i t 2 have been obtained from the n't and |i’ t in the equation (4.6).
The behaviour of this model differs from the Standard CAR through its splitting fac­
tor. We therefore only need to concentrate on the properties of the Total ( onflict.
General remarks:
with
where
P12 P22
and R is the covariance matrix of beliefs.
Let us look at the simplest case when
t t
P t t
IT
1. TC is a non-negative function of 1C and EC and various precisions. Therefore
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40 is usually a negative constant representing the tolerance of the aggregator 
to the conflict generated by the contributors.
2. Double Conflict is designed to be used when both contributors face bimodal 
expected losses. It is an extension of the Standard CAR in the sense that when 
1C 0 , the TC is essentially an increasing function of A , which plays the 
role of the splitting factor in the Standard CAR.
3. The inherent availability of bimodality in t’ , and E2 enables us to introduce 
the notion of "negative internal conflict " when bimodality does not occur. 
"Negative 1C" must be distinguished from a structural unimodality of the ear­
lier models. It represents some kind of inner confidence of the contributor and 
is linked with high precision of beliefs and intolerance to losses.
Properties of TC:
1. External Conflict.
P 1 -
2 ,. 2 \<r (1 -  p )
1 -p|
- p  1 I
Hence
A(a:.r ,p)
K  “  °2
2<rJ(l -  p)
(i) ,r2 ~ -x- = >  A - 0 .
No precision means the aggregator cannot attach any significance to 
disagreement among .4, and A2 .
(ii) p -  1 then A - * unless a, = a, .
Conflict explodes if perfectly correlated contributors clash.
(¡¡¡) As p decreases A decreases since disagreement is less surprising when 4 ,
and A, are less correlated.
(iv) p = 0 . Then
A = — “ (<*, “  “ 2)
2ir
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where
* .j  *  2( r i )  cos
x.a =2 (r,)13cos
V
27
0. + 2tt
0. + 4 7*
( min ) 
( max )
8 .  -  c o s
a, / 2
[(*, / 27)' 
Since 0 <  8, < it, we have
x . l  >  X|3  ^  Xl2
The interaction matrix for Et and E2 is
The covariance matrix is
*i + *12 ~ '"n
* 1 2  +  ^ 1 2  * 2  *  ^  2
^.2
V-,
So the Double Conflict aggregation procedure yields 
a = 1TR *(x -* )-* -  x0
b -  exp I r 8 + exp -  A|r fi + exp A + b0
to form W = ( o , b ) as the control space of
E: X  x W -  R
The optimisation gives, say,
Then
opt = (i, ,i , )
A =* (* -  ï )  P (* ~ *
•i
2
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Notice that using Maxwell Rule, the sign of at determines which root of (4.8) we will 
choose:
. fx(1 if > 0 
lx,, if o, <  0
If o, = 0  the local decision is ambiguous.
Normal Case of Double Conflict ( Exact Method )
Consider again the mixture
E,(x,) <»£(x, -  |x.) *  (1 -  a )E(zi + (i.)
where
£'(,) 1 expl -  ~
k + V )  I 2 ( k + V )
Instead of using an approximation to canonical cusp catastrophe we can find the exact 
shape of the bifurcation set of Ei as follows: Define
£(y) = 1 -  ~C (y) P
where
and
G it)
(* + V ) 32 PXP I 2(i + K) 1
p  - (* + V )  *
Then clearly, (see Chapter 3)
E i t )  -  yG(y)
E |y) * -  (y2p -  l)C(y)
E ( y )  =  y [ ( y p ) 2 -  3 p | C ( y )
Bifurcation set is given by equations
£.(*.) ”
«,(* , -  -  p.) + (1 -  «,)(*, P-,)CU, lO  “  0 (4.9)
« s i *  "  Pii*i ~ H,)a|G(4 "  H.) + (I -  «•,)[! -  p,(x, + n j V i * .  + M^.) -  0 (4.10)
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Dividing (4.9) by (4.10) we get:
(*, -  M-.) (*i + M-.)1 ~ P ,(*, -  M-,)2 1 -  Pj(*< +  M-i)2
Hence
M-t = *,
P.
Putting (4.11) back into (4.9) we obtain the equation of the bifurcation set as
-  B{ tO
where
1 1 
1 + exp Vip^ e^  —
P .e. P .e.
c, = M-é + (M-. -  )
Pi
So the internal conflict, corresponding to the bimodal region of Ei, is given by
ft, | W(|x,) — V* | — |u, — Vi|, for 0 S  S  1 
We can now use the exact
S = I in place of ft.
4.4 Butterfly Aggregation Rule
(4.11)
(4.12)
4.4.1 Introduction
Using notation analogous to that in the previous sections consider
E: X  x W - R
the aggregate expected loss function constructed for the set £ ,, • • • ,£„ of expected loss 
functions
E,  : A, x V, - «  i' = l ......n
In this chapter we will be solely concerned with the case
dim W = 4
i.e. the aggregation function
- 148 -
<r : A , x ••• X / ^ x K - W '
has image of dimension four.
Thus E is qualitatively equivalent to the Butterfly potential.
The discussion that follows is a natural extension of cusp models to cases involving 
three local minima of potential. We will be looking both at new models and extend some 
of the cusp models presented earlier. It is felt, in general, that butterfly models are of 
much greater importance, and it is intended, eventually, to treat cusp models as their spe­
cial cases. This will be true, in particular, of the " Double Conflict " model described in 
the last section.
4.4.2 Butterfly Aggregation Rules
The geometry of the canonical Butterfly Catastrophe is described in 1.3.2. Using that 
analysis we can now develop various constructions of the 4 - dimensional control space W 
of
discussed in the introduction.
E: X  x W -  ft
(1) Simple Butterfly Aggregation Rule
The most trivial construction is an exact analogue of the corresponding CAR case. 
Let n 4 and consider
<r: A , X • • • x A 4 x  V -  W = (to ,, • • • ,to4 ) 
an aggregation function which can be split into components
<r (<r,, • • • ,<r4)
with
tr,: 4, x Vi - to,
Such models can only be applicable if we can identify the independence of all four 
components and project them on to the appropriate axes of the control space.
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There is also a possibility of some rotation of the axes, say
where a, t  A t and A„ is the rotation matrix with ft a function of Vt x • • • x Vt and w0 a 
translation in the W space.
Essentially such models require
(i) clear independence of the four inputs;
(ii) identifiability of each input with either one exact control axis in W or 
with some rotation and displacement of the four orthogonal axes in W .
In practice these conditions will rarely be satisfied.
(2) Extended Double Conflict
Let
£.(*.) ”  1 “  t (“ ..fl>xp| ~ — *,* ~ ~ J
where x, c Ait » = 1,2 Vt = (a ,,ß ,).
Recall the Double Conflict aggregation method discussed earlier.
Define
I N - N  »
and then put
b = fij + b2
as the internal conflict of the system.
Next define the external conflict by
A = (x — x)TP '(x -  x)
where P 1 is the interaction matrix.
The aggregation method proposed in 4.2.4 defines
<r : .4, x .42x V -  W = (a,4)
by
a =  1 R (x -  x) +  a„
. A . a . a*0 = e f  e + e + 40
where R is the covariance matrix.
This method can be extended to a Butterfly rule by treating A and ft as separate fac­
tors. The final result is then Tar more sensitive and should lead to decisions more accept­
able to both sides.
Thus define
r: A t x  A 2 x  V -  W (a .b .c .d )
with
o = 1TR *(x — x) 
4 = A
(4.14)
"o
C eo *  Mp II -  P2t)
d = fi + d0
where I is a linear function of the difference between the " precisions " of the two sides. 
However, it is not an essential term and may be left out.
Notice that the splitting factor in the original method has now been divided into the 
splitting and the butterfly factors. We have explained, in chapter 1, the roles which these 
two factors play. This can now be appreciated in a practical context:
(i) 4 causes the split of the minima as an external evidence of the difference of 
opinions;
(ii) d measures the internal uncertainty of each proponent and causes yet 
another split, perhaps leading to a compromise solution;
(iii) e is related to the precision of the information available to each side, and
therefore it will sway the position of the cusp(s) accordingly.
- 151 -
(iv) In the special case when
l*
(a)
(b)
( c )
(d)
2 2 <r p<r
2 2 ptr cr
(*)
we can use the earlier analysis of the Double Conflict aggregation to describe 
the behaviour of this model:
The normal factor is the same as in all our previous examples;
<*, *  «,)
A ------------------
2 ir* ( 1 -  p)
and so the splitting factor is represented by the EC whose properties we 
have examined in 4.3.4;
Similarly,
ft = + &2
gives the butterfly factor;
The constant terms (a0,i>0,c0,<i0) represent the aggregator’s bias towards 
either contributor and his resistance to conflict and compromise. The 
latter, d0 , may be positive or negative depending on whether or not the 
aggregator is conducive to a compromise solution;
To determine the qualitative type of the expected loss we can use the 
methods described in 1.3.2.
(3) General BAR
Let us now consider a more general situation with
E, : Ai x Vi • R i = l .... n
and dimVt s  2 ensuring that the E, are at most bimodal.
Then we can naturally extend the above scheme by putting
t - 1
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where is given by (4.13), and then use the equations (4.14) to define the aggregation 
map. The only problem comes with e , and l will have to be replaced by some map which 
will polarise all the opinions and then move the cusp towards the most " precise " group. 
Alternatively, l may be left out altogether.
Note that if, for some i , Et turns out to be unimodal it will have no positive contri­
bution to the internal conflict. In the extreme case, when all the Ex are unimodal, the 
butterfly factor will probably be negative ( depending on the size of d0 ), and the 
compromise opinion will not emerge. But surely we would expect this to be the case when 
each individual is confident about his own views and has no internal conflict.
(4) Double Butterfly Conflict
We have not yet looked at the case when one or more of the component expected 
losses are themselves trimodal. Let us look at this in the case n 2 and refer to the situa­
tion as the Double Butterfly aggregation problem.
Thus Ex are equivalent to the canonical Butterfly. The two relevant discriminants
are
WLOC let
£,(*,) = 1 -  *(a,,|i,,y,,C,)exp
6
6
4
4
3
2 ~  t t . Z ,
1=1,2 x, c A
3 2
a
3 2
the internal conflict, and
a
T,
5 2
the internai eompromite .
The results of the section 1.3.2 are useful in determining the shape of Ex according to 
the values of (f>,,r,) . Also the name of the t , discriminant becomes clear in this context:
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the more positive value of t , , the more likely is the compromise region to emerge.
more interested in the reduction of the minima. The problem presented here can be per­
fectly satisfactorily handled by CAR models. When more sensitivity is required we pro­
pose the following BAR model to aggregate the two above:
d —
Only the bias factor requires some explanation. Basically, the aggregated model will
compromise. But this n orientation ” of the bias is purely arbitrary. It can be argued that 
the bias should, in fact , be directed towards the more uncompromising and confident con­
tributor. Therefore the sign reversal on the bias factor is acceptable if preferred.
4.4.3 Comments and Conclusions
ButterHy Aggregation Rules have been presented here as the natural extension of the 
Cusp Aggregation Rules. But it is perhaps more appropriate to look at the latter as a spe­
cial simplified case of the former. Butterfly models are obviously more sensitive and accu­
rate. If enough information is available it is clearly an advantage to consider more aspects 
in order to produce efficient decisions. These models will be particularly useful when deal­
ing with highly conflicted groups and trying somehow to bring them together. In such
When aggregating two Butterflies it may be more useful perhaps to employ a higher 
order catastrophe. On the other hand not much more can be gained by further increasing 
the number of minima of the expected loss function. In fact, in many cases people will be
<r: X A 2 x  V -  W = (a,byc ?d)
be defined by
a. - 1T R l(x — x) + a0 
6 = (x -  i ) TP ‘ (x -  x) + 40
e = T, -  t,  + i 0
show some bias towards that contributor who shows more flexibility and willingness to
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cases CAR models would only amplify all the existing disagreements, and provide few 
clues on the possible cures, whilst the BAR models might be able to detect any areas 
where some compromise could be reached.
In many cases, however, the use of BAR models would not be justified. Sometimes 
there are not enough independent inputs to merit the use of a four-dimensional control 
space. Also, in some cases, the computations involved in identifying all four factors are 
too heavy to warrant the use of a BAR model. And, of course, in most practical situations 
the issue of trimodality does not arise, and CAR ( or simpler ) models are sufficient to 
illustrate all the complexities of the situation.
Perhaps the best practical advice that can be offered at, present is to perform the ori­
ginal aggregation using a CAR model. If this does not take account of all the aspects and 
does not help in finding acceptable decisions, then a Butterfly model must be the one to be 
tried next.
4.4.4 Normal Cases of Some BAR
Throughout this section the contributor expected loss functions will be of the form
= a , E (z. ~  P.) + t1 ~ a i )E i*i + I1.) 
where E is the Normal expected loss function given by
E(y) l _ ( _ * _ )  ( _ _ J L _ |
L p M  2(*+ V) i
Following the results of section 4.2.4, the bifurcation set of Ei can be obtained either 
by approximation or exactly, and the respective values of the internal conflict are as fol­
lows: a l
fi. = I— I -  ~
where
6. = 3(n.J -  1)
o, = 2 ^ (0 , / I  -  a,)
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ft, = | — v. | -  |a, -  fel, for 0 S a, s  1
where fl(p.,) is given by (4.12) in 4.3.4.
(1) Extended Double Conflict
The aggregation function ir:.4 ,x4jX  V -  W = (a ,b,e,d) is given by (4.14) in the 
tion 4.3.3(2).
In the Normal case ( using the same notation as before ) we have
¿ 1  Vrl A: 1 2  — V |2 Pi. P 1 2— =
^ 1 2  ^ 1 2  ^ 2  ""  ^2 PH P 22
Using the approximate ft, lirst, ir becomes ( assuming r, •+• i 2 ® )
- _ , r v x 1^2a 1  ^ 12 ^2
. 7* Pit P 12b = X P12 P 22
Pn P22 + ' 0
2 [ u,
2  (p .j -  i)3 -  dog---------- )I 1 — a, I
Consider two particular cases:
(i) Vt = V, = V, v lt  = 0 
= kt  «  k , i „  = 0
Then
1
a -  —(*, + i 7) *  “ 0 - “ 0
b « -------(*,* + ***) + *o
k + V
(i) vt «  vt -  r , pv
sec-
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t, = kt -  k, kt2 = 0
P 1 =
(* + v )* -  v V  VP
\V + k —V p I
l-K p  v  + k\
and hence
K( 1  +  p)
b =
Vp ,
V + K
(K + *)[1 -  ------=—
( V + k f
It is worthwhile to examine the dependence of 4 on p for constant z l ,z2,b0,k, V :
«<?)
1 ( 0 )  :
Note also that
6(1) - 6(0) V3 [ , * )'  * j  |(*i **)  ^ , *i** I(V + t)[(V + t) -  V*] 1 v )
k (*l -  zt )*
6(1) s  6(0) < = >  —  s
V 2x,xa
The increase in the correlation of the two beliefs does not relate to the splitting fac­
tor in a linear manner. In fact, if the last inequality holds ( which may, for instance, hap­
pen if and x,* are far apart ) the conflict between parties with perfect correlation may 
be greater than that of independent parties.
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If we use the exact Rt this will only affect the butterfly factor, which is independent 
of the decision space. In order to create the third ( "compromise" ) minimum we require 
(i) d >  0 , i.e. at least one contributor has a bimodal expected loss;
(ii) 6 <  0
(Hi) (6,d) in the trimodality region ( see section 1.3.2 ).
(2) Double Butterfly
Consider
a£ . ( * . )  *  M u . )  *  a t . E (z . ~  M2 i ) +  “ ! , £ ( « ,  “  M3. )  .  with —  1
> “ 1
where once again
£ (y )  1 -  (3*)'exp | -  * |
by putting k -  V ~  , for convenience.
3
Assume additionally p.Jt = 0 . Then following Smith and Harrison (22 ) , £,(8,) exhi­
bits a unique Butterfly point at
>a l . >a l .»M i. iM*.) “  ( 0 , r , r , l , - l )
where
r = [2(1 ♦ 2e *'*| '
Taylor series expansion around the Butterfly point gives the following approximation 
of E% to the canonical butterfly:
x, = 3(u„ -  a lt) + 2(p,, + p.lt)|
6
2 M,. “  Mj.
d, -  10 ( « „  -  0.31) ♦ - ( --------------  -  1),
3 2
10
c, = ~ (Mj. + Mi.)
3
< m -  7(a„ -  0.31)
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a i =  2(^3. +  M-i.) “  3(a3, -  a u );
27
Thus for each Et we can calculate the internal conflict
10
a%
, o
7 5 2
-  - ( a 2, -  0.31) -  ( — ) + Hi,,) -  3(u3l -  a ,,)
3 27
and the internal compromise
10° 1 , 2
----- (uj, -  0.31) + —(m-,. ~ ^3.) -
2 3 3
100 2 
( t * 3 .  *  M - l . )6
The aggregation function
r: .4, X ,4j X V -  W [a,b,e,d)
is given by
a = 1T R *(x -  x) + a0 
4 = (x -  x)TP '(x -  x) + 40
C  T .  -  T ,  +  c
d = fi, d„
where
R
^ , 3  ^ * 3  ^ 3
*1 *1 3  * 13
P = R
Consider two particular cases:
(»)
*, *
Vt -  V2 V3 = V, v „  »  0 if • * j
0 if i * j
Then, assuming x 0
I
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a
V
(x, + X, + x3) + a0 = a 0
i
* + V
k, k2 = k3 = k, A'.j = 0  if i # j
Then
a x
V t
t ix V *  k
b 4,oT -  it
Once again 6 is a quadratic in p , and the splitting factor is not a decreasing function
of p .
A Double Butterfly is a natural extension of a Double Conflict at the level of the 
(a,6) - section of the bifurcation set. The butterfly factor is constructed from the internal 
conflict in each case. Note that bimodal expected losses may have much larger internal 
conflicts than trimodal ones. The main structural difference comes in the construction of 
the bias factor. One can treat the bimodal case as having a zero compromise, and hence 
the bias in the Double Conflict is a either constant or a linear function of the precision 
difference.
4.5 A Remark
Intuitively aggregation must sometimes lead to multimodal expected loss functions. 
The energy approach provides a natural framework for modelling such phenomena.
Above we have only looked at simple cases where only two or three regimes appear 
in competition. The object is to illustrate the potential of the method. In the end the com­
plexity of any model, within the aggregation dispute or anywhere else, is arbitrary. The 
investigator decides how much information and how many aspects are going to be

5. C on c lu s ion s
The original aim of this work was to construct models for aggregation of beliefs. Spe­
cial emphasis was to be placed on decision making in the face of conflict. From the study 
of recent literature it soon became clear that the aggregation debate had no specific direc­
tion and various researches were only concerned with isolated issues. No general frame­
work existed and even the most basic elements of the problem have not been clearly 
defined. Thus the first task was to set up some foundations and proceed from there.
It soon became apparent that the traditional probability theory could not provide 
the axiomatic set up to tackle the aggregation issue. As was mentioned in the preface 
Measure Theory had not been equipped with any means to amalgamate separate meas­
ures. Obviously we had to look for methodology elsewhere. Non-additive methods seemed 
very attractive as they could cope with problems such as incoherence and inconsistency of 
any of the group members whose beliefs we were combining. However these methods 
added a lot of other complications especially when elicitation was concerned.
Finally a new formulative model was devised. This differs very little from the tradi­
tional set up in the sense that Kolmogorov axioms are being obeyed. The emphasis is 
moved away from the probability measure and placed upon a certain "invisible" energy 
function. This creates a kind of a "gravitational field" and both observable and unobserv­
able events are subjected to its force. The basic assumption is that every model of uncer­
tainty had an associated energy function which generated such a field.
Philosophically our approach is closest perhaps to the propensity interpretation of 
probability. The "Fair Coin" model, presented in Chapter 2, best illustrates this resem­
blance.
Once the concept of the measure has been removed from the focal point of the 
theory the aggregation issues can be reviewed in a fresh light. In Chapter 4 we looked at 
one particular method. An aggregator is placed in a position where he can choose the 
geometric structure of his decision problem. We only looked at cases where two or three
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conflicting sets of options are available, but that was felt to be sufficient to introduce the 
method. In any case, in practice it is rarely cost-efficient to consider a more polarised 
situation and still hope to achieve a working consensus. The basic advantage in amal­
gamating energy functions lies in the fact that they do not have to obey any laws of pro­
bability. The difficulties associated with using measures in aggregation stems from the 
fact that no one quite knows what laws they are supposed to obey. Inevitably ad hoe 
methods are being disguised as "laws of nature". This criticism is levelled in particular at 
the Bayesian models of Lindley (47) and French (42), who appear to be especially dog­
matic.
In our view, ad hoe methods are unavoidable. We believe it is futile to try to estab­
lish exact laws governing disputes. The only problem lies in finding efficient ad hoe rules. 
The models suggested in this work should be treated as empirical. We first create the 
framework in which it seems easier to manouver. Then we define a set of rules. These 
rules are neither to difficult to use nor too insensitive to capture conflict. The reader 
should view the aggregation models as dependent on the asserted structure of uncertainty. 
But the converse is not true. Should the models prove to be unacceptable the suggested 
interpretation of probability here can still survive on its own merits.
The basic tool used throughout this work is Catastrophe Theory. At first it appeared 
to be the most natural way of modelling conflict. Later we found that the description of 
any model of uncertainty can incorporate potential functions. In this way C atastrophe 
Theory models ended up in almost all corners of this dissertation.
It can be said that the philosophy behind all our methodology is based on the belief 
that , no matter how polarised, all situations have an underlying smooth, and perhaps 
multimodal, structure.
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